Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990)

Facts

  • Laura Lee Wright and Robert L. Giles were jointly charged in Idaho with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under 16 involving Wright’s two daughters (ages 5½ and 2½).
  • The older child reported to an adult caretaker that Giles sexually abused her while Wright restrained her, and that she observed similar abuse of the younger child.
  • Medical examination of the older child showed evidence of sexual abuse.
  • The younger child was examined the next day by Dr. John Jambura, a pediatrician experienced in child-abuse cases, who found findings strongly suggestive of recent sexual abuse.
  • At trial, the younger child (age 3) was found unable to communicate to the jury and thus unavailable as a witness.
  • Over objection, the trial court admitted the younger child’s out-of-court statements to Dr. Jambura under Idaho’s residual hearsay exception (Idaho R. Evid. 803(24)).
  • Dr. Jambura testified the child was reluctant to answer questions about her own abuse but volunteered information about her sister’s abuse.
  • Wright was convicted on both counts; on appeal she challenged only the conviction relating to the younger child.

Issues

  1. Whether statements admitted under a residual (“catchall”) hearsay exception qualify as admitted under a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception for Confrontation Clause purposes.
  2. If not firmly rooted, whether the child’s statements had “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment when the declarant was unavailable.
  3. Whether reliability may be established using corroborating evidence introduced at trial rather than the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court affirmed the Idaho Supreme Court in a 5–4 decision authored by Justice O’Connor.
  • Idaho’s residual hearsay exception was not a firmly rooted hearsay exception, so no presumption of reliability applied.
  • The State did not establish particularized guarantees of trustworthiness for the younger child’s statements to the pediatrician.
  • Reliability had to be assessed from circumstances surrounding the making of the statements; corroborating evidence at trial could not supply the needed reliability.
  • Admission of the hearsay statements violated the Confrontation Clause, requiring reversal of Wright’s conviction on the count involving the younger child.
  • When the prosecution uses hearsay from an unavailable declarant, the Confrontation Clause requires “adequate indicia of reliability.”
  • Reliability is shown only if the statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or is supported by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
  • A residual hearsay exception is not firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause purposes.
  • Particularized guarantees of trustworthiness must be drawn from the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, not from corroboration or other evidence introduced at trial.
  • Lack of specific procedural safeguards (e.g., videotaping) is not automatically dispositive, but the statement remains inadmissible unless trustworthiness is established from permissible circumstances.

Conclusion

The Court held that admitting a very young child’s hearsay statements to a pediatrician under a residual hearsay exception, without a showing of trustworthiness based on the statement’s surrounding circumstances, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and it affirmed reversal of the conviction relating to the younger child.