## Facts

- The United States submitted sealed, ex parte applications in the Eastern District of New York seeking: (1) orders under the Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127, authorizing installation and use of pen registers and trap-and-trace devices; and (2) an order compelling release of subscriber-related information under related authority, including 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
- The applications requested collection of “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information,” but also sought two categories that raised statutory limits:
  - **Post-cut-through dialed digits (PCTDD)**—digits entered after a call connects, which can transmit items such as extension numbers, bank account numbers, Social Security numbers, passwords, PINs, or menu selections in an automated system.
  - **Prospective cell-site/location-related information** tied to the target phones.
- The court initially granted the requests only in part, authorizing traditional pen/trap collection but declining to authorize (i) collection of PCTDD to the extent it would include the contents of communications, and (ii) prospective location tracking based solely on the Pen/Trap Statute’s low threshold.
- The government moved for reconsideration, arguing that PCTDD and the requested location information could be obtained under the Pen/Trap Statute’s certification and relevance framework, and that technical limits made it difficult to filter out content at the point of collection.
- The reported decision (often referenced as the “Azrack Opinion,” authored by Judge Joan M. Azrack) resolves the motion for reconsideration and explains why the Pen/Trap Statute cannot be used to obtain communication contents or to authorize prospective cell-site/location tracking without using the proper statutory mechanism.

## Issues

1. Whether a pen register/trap-and-trace order may authorize collection of post-cut-through dialed digits when those digits may reveal the “contents” of communications.
2. Whether a pen register/trap-and-trace order, standing alone, may compel or authorize acquisition of prospective cell-site/location information and other detailed location-related data associated with a target device.
3. Whether practical or technical difficulty in separating content from non-content digits permits broader collection under the Pen/Trap Statute’s relevance standard.

## Decision

- The court denied reconsideration as to PCTDD and refused to authorize collection of PCTDD to the extent those digits would reveal the contents of communications.
- The court reaffirmed that pen register/trap-and-trace authority is limited to non-content “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling” information and cannot be expanded to include content simply because filtering is difficult.
- The court also declined to treat a Pen/Trap order as sufficient, by itself, to authorize acquisition of prospective cell-site/location information; it required the government to proceed under the appropriate, separate legal authority for such data.
- The applications were granted only in part, consistent with these limits.

## Legal Principles

- A pen register records or decodes “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information,” but “shall not include the contents of any communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3); see also id. § 3127(4) (trap-and-trace definition with the same content limitation).
- “Contents” means information concerning the “substance, purport, or meaning” of a communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
- Post-cut-through dialed digits are not automatically non-content: when digits entered after connection transmit substantive information (for example, account identifiers, authentication codes, or menu choices communicating decisions), those digits can qualify as “contents” and fall outside pen/trap authority.
- The Pen/Trap Statute’s certification/relevance process cannot be used as a substitute for the more demanding procedures Congress requires for acquiring communication contents (including Title III procedures where applicable).
- Prospective cell-site/location tracking is materially different from basic call-routing metadata; the Pen/Trap Statute does not independently authorize ongoing location acquisition, and the government must use the separate statutory route that governs compelled disclosure of such information (including the Stored Communications Act framework where applicable).

## Conclusion

In In re Applications, 515 F. Supp. 2d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), the court held that the Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute does not permit collection of post-cut-through dialed digits to the extent they reveal the contents of communications, and it further held that the government cannot obtain prospective cell-site/location information based solely on a pen/trap order; instead, content and location acquisition must proceed under the separate, higher requirements Congress created for those categories of information.


In re Applications of the United States for Orders Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers & Trap & Trace Devices & Authorizing Release of Subscriber Information, 515 F. Supp. 2d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).