## Facts

- On July 7, 1994, Benjamin L., age 15, was arrested in Yonkers after allegedly menacing a delivery person and attempting to steal food; he was detained overnight.
- On July 8, 1994, a detention facility director filed a pre-petition detention application under Family Court Act (FCA) §§ 307.3 and 307.4.
- Family Court denied detention, released Benjamin to his mother, and ordered a 10:00 p.m. curfew.
- On August 2, 1995—over one year after the arrest and detention application—the presentment agency filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute attempted robbery in the second degree and menacing in the third degree.
- Benjamin appeared with counsel, denied the allegations, and moved to dismiss, arguing (1) statutory speedy-hearing violations under FCA §§ 310.2, 320.2, and 340.1, and (2) due process violations based on pre-accusatory delay principles.
- Family Court denied dismissal without a hearing, relied on adult speedy-trial analysis, adjudicated Benjamin a juvenile delinquent after hearings, and imposed one year of probation.
- The Appellate Division affirmed, likewise relying on adult speedy-trial factors and not addressing the statutory speedy-hearing arguments.

## Issues

1. Whether a substantial pre-petition delay in initiating a juvenile delinquency proceeding must be evaluated under the Family Court Act’s statutory speedy-hearing scheme and its purposes, rather than solely under adult criminal speedy-trial factors.
2. Whether due process limits on pre-accusatory delay require an inquiry into justification and prejudice in juvenile delinquency proceedings, including whether a hearing may be required before denying dismissal.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted to Family Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
- The Court held that the lower courts erred by analyzing the motion solely through adult criminal speedy-trial factors and by failing to address the Family Court Act’s statutory timing framework.
- The Court determined that substantial pre-petition delay in juvenile matters calls for an inquiry grounded in the statutory scheme and due process principles, potentially requiring a hearing to develop a record on justification and prejudice.
- The Court did not dismiss the petition outright, but required a proper, record-based determination of the statutory and due process claims.

## Legal Principles

- Juvenile delinquency proceedings are governed by a distinct statutory framework and should not be evaluated by importing adult criminal speedy-trial doctrines without considering the Family Court Act’s structure and purposes.
- The Family Court Act reflects a legislative policy that juvenile matters proceed expeditiously; substantial pre-petition delay is subject to judicial scrutiny in light of that policy.
- Due process constrains unjustified pre-accusatory delay; in juvenile cases, the risk of prejudice from delay may be heightened because youth may have greater difficulty preserving and presenting evidence over time.
- When a respondent makes a substantial claim of pre-petition delay, the court must meaningfully address the statutory and due process arguments and may need to hold a hearing to assess justification for the delay and actual prejudice.

## Conclusion

The court required Family Court to evaluate a year-long pre-petition delay under the Family Court Act’s expeditious-processing policy and due process limits on pre-accusatory delay, rather than relying only on adult speedy-trial factors, and remitted for a record-based inquiry that could include a hearing and potential dismissal if warranted.


In re Benjamin L., 92 N.Y.2d 660, 708 N.E.2d 156 (N.Y. 1999)