## Facts

- Ida M. Capers died domiciled in Pennsylvania, leaving a will that directed her two Irish setter dogs be destroyed upon her death.
- The executors petitioned for declaratory judgment on whether they could lawfully carry out the will’s destruction directive.
- The Pennsylvania Attorney General intervened, pursuant to executive direction, opposing euthanasia of the dogs.
- At an evidentiary hearing, witnesses (including the veterinarian) testified Capers was deeply attached to the dogs and feared they would suffer or be neglected after her death.
- Evidence also showed the dogs were healthy and, after Capers’s death, were receiving excellent care from Thomas L. Miller.
- The executors faced a conflict between literal compliance with the will and the apparent absence of any welfare-based need to destroy the animals.

## Issues

1. Whether a testamentary clause directing the destruction of a testatrix’s healthy dogs is valid and enforceable.
2. Whether a court may refuse enforcement of such a clause as contrary to law or public policy while otherwise giving effect to the will.

## Decision

- The court denied authorization to destroy the dogs and entered declaratory judgment that the will’s destruction direction was unenforceable.
- The court treated the clause as void on public policy grounds where the animals were healthy and adequately cared for.
- The court severed the offending provision rather than disturbing the remainder of the will’s dispositive scheme.

## Legal Principles

- Testamentary freedom is limited; courts will not enforce will provisions requiring acts that are illegal or contrary to public policy.
- Public policy reflected in humane-treatment norms and animal-cruelty law disfavors unnecessary destruction of healthy animals.
- Euthanasia may be justified to prevent or end animal suffering, but killing healthy animals solely to satisfy a testamentary preference is not.
- In declaratory-judgment proceedings, a probate court may construe a will and withhold enforcement of an impermissible directive while preserving valid provisions.

## Conclusion

The court held that a will clause ordering the euthanasia of healthy dogs could not be enforced because it required unnecessary destruction inconsistent with public policy, and it severed that clause while leaving the rest of the will intact.


In re Capers’s Est., 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Allegheny Cnty. 1964)