## Facts

- Christian S., a minor, experienced roughly a year of physical and verbal harassment by Robert Elliott and Elliott’s friends.
- Christian began carrying a handgun because he feared Elliott.
- At a beach encounter, Elliott chased Christian, threatened him, and repeatedly advanced while taunting Christian to shoot.
- When Elliott came within about 20 feet, Christian fired the handgun and killed Elliott.
- In juvenile court, Christian asserted imperfect self-defense, claiming he actually believed he faced imminent death or great bodily injury, even if that belief was unreasonable.
- The juvenile court rejected the imperfect self-defense theory, sustained an allegation equivalent to second-degree murder if committed by an adult, and declared Christian a ward of the court.

## Issues

1. Whether the 1981 amendments to Penal Code sections 28, 29, and 188 (abolishing diminished capacity and limiting related mental-state evidence) abrogated the doctrine of imperfect self-defense.
2. What the proper scope and limits of imperfect self-defense are as a malice-negating doctrine reducing murder to voluntary manslaughter.

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court held that the 1981 statutory reforms did not abolish imperfect self-defense.
- The Court reaffirmed that a defendant who kills because of an actual but unreasonable belief in the need to defend against imminent death or great bodily injury acts without malice and cannot be convicted of a crime greater than voluntary manslaughter.
- The Court distinguished imperfect self-defense from diminished capacity and clarified limitations on when the doctrine applies.
- The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeal’s judgment, with directions reflecting the clarified understanding of the doctrine.

## Legal Principles

- Imperfect self-defense applies when the trier of fact finds the defendant actually, though unreasonably, believed deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily injury.
- An actual but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense negates malice aforethought and reduces what would otherwise be murder to voluntary manslaughter; it does not justify or excuse the killing.
- The 1981 amendments targeting diminished capacity did not express legislative intent to mandate murder liability where malice is negated by an honest (though unreasonable) belief in imminent peril.
- Imperfect self-defense is not a diminished-capacity doctrine; it turns on the defendant’s subjective belief arising from perceived circumstances, not on an asserted inability to form mental states due to mental disease, defect, or intoxication.
- The doctrine is limited: it requires imminence and a genuine subjective fear; it does not cover preemptive, retaliatory, or revenge killings, and may be unavailable where the defendant is the initial aggressor or otherwise lacks a sincere belief in imminent peril.

## Conclusion

The court preserved imperfect self-defense after the 1981 reforms, holding that an actual but unreasonable belief in the need to use lethal force against imminent death or great bodily injury negates malice and reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter, while emphasizing the doctrine’s narrow, imminence-based limits.


In re Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th 768, 872 P.2d 574 (Cal. 1994)