## Facts

- Nine-year-old Cynthia Tew disappeared on June 26, 1977, in Shreveport, Louisiana, and was later found critically injured in woods behind the Tew and Dino homes; she died shortly thereafter from severe head wounds.
- Thirteen-year-old Andrew Leonard Dino, a neighborhood child who joined the search, told others that he found Cynthia in the wooded area.
- During the early investigation, police treated Dino as a potential witness rather than a suspect.
- On July 8, 1977, Dino went to the police station and gave a recorded “witness informational” statement; his parents were not in the interrogation room, and Dino did not incriminate himself.
- Police later focused on inconsistencies and sought additional questioning, including arranging a polygraph (at least one scheduled test was canceled after a parent objected due to Dino’s nervousness).
- Dino’s mother later contacted police, and officers asked her to bring Dino to the station; she complied.
- At the station, police isolated Dino from his mother and interrogated him.
- Police did not tell Dino or his mother that she could be present during questioning; neither Dino nor his mother asked that she be allowed into the interrogation.
- Dino gave an inculpatory statement confessing to the killing.
- In ensuing juvenile delinquency proceedings (based on an allegation of first-degree murder), Dino moved to suppress the confession and also sought a jury trial and a public trial; the juvenile court denied those motions, and the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed the pretrial rulings on writs.

## Issues

1. Whether the State proved that a 13-year-old’s waiver of Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent when police isolated the juvenile from his mother and obtained a confession without meaningful consultation with an informed, interested adult.
2. Whether a juvenile delinquency adjudication requires a jury trial.
3. Whether a juvenile delinquency adjudication must be open to the public.

## Decision

- The Louisiana Supreme Court held Dino’s confession inadmissible and reversed the juvenile court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
- The court concluded the State failed to carry its burden to show a knowing and intelligent waiver of the rights to silence and counsel in light of Dino’s age and the absence of meaningful adult guidance before waiver.
- The court adopted a protective approach for juvenile waivers, requiring, as a condition of a valid waiver in this setting, a meaningful opportunity for the juvenile to consult with an attorney or an informed and interested adult (such as a parent, guardian, or similar person) who is acting in the juvenile’s interest and understands the rights at stake.
- The court upheld the juvenile court’s denial of Dino’s requests for a jury trial and a public trial in the delinquency proceeding.
- The matter was remanded for further proceedings without use of the suppressed inculpatory statement.

## Legal Principles

- The State bears the burden of proving a Miranda waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; that burden is applied with special care when the accused is a child.
- For young juveniles, a waiver is not shown by warnings and a verbal assent alone; the State must show the child had a meaningful chance, before waiver, to consult with counsel or an informed, interested adult who is acting for the child’s welfare.
- Police isolation of a juvenile from a parent (especially without advising that the parent may be present) is a major factor cutting against a valid waiver under the totality of the circumstances.
- Juvenile delinquency adjudications in Louisiana may proceed without a jury and may be closed to the public consistent with the juvenile court framework and due process requirements.

## Conclusion

In *In re Dino*, the Louisiana Supreme Court suppressed a 13-year-old’s stationhouse confession because the State did not prove that Dino knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights after meaningful consultation with an informed, interested adult; the court remanded for further proceedings and also rejected claims to a jury trial and an open, public delinquency adjudication.


In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (1978)