## Facts

- Daniella and Otakar, an unmarried couple, conceived a child, Richard.
- For roughly the first eight months of Daniella’s pregnancy, Otakar provided Daniella with support.
- Otakar left to visit his native country near the end of the pregnancy.
- While Otakar was away, Daniella learned that Otakar had a relationship with another woman, moved out of the shared apartment, and arranged for Richard to be adopted by the Doe family.
- Daniella gave birth at a different hospital than the one she and Otakar had planned to use.
- When Otakar returned and repeatedly tried to locate Daniella and the baby, Daniella told him the baby had died at birth.
- Daniella told the Does that she knew the identity of Richard’s father but refused to disclose his name.
- The Does made no effort to locate or notify Richard’s biological father.
- Otakar learned of the adoption 57 days after Richard’s birth and promptly filed an appearance to contest the adoption.
- The trial court upheld the adoption, finding Otakar “unfit” on the ground that he failed to show a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility during Richard’s first 30 days of life, so his consent was not required.
- The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Richard was not property and did not “belong” to either set of adults, and that only Richard’s best interests should control.
- By the time the case reached the Illinois Supreme Court, Richard had lived with the Does for about three years.

## Issues

1. Whether an unwed father may be found unfit for failing to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility during the first 30 days after birth when the mother concealed the birth and falsely told him the child had died.
2. Whether a court may uphold an adoption based only on the child’s best interests without first establishing, under the Adoption Act, a legally sufficient basis to dispense with the biological father’s consent.

## Decision

- The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the appellate court’s approach that treated the adoption dispute as controlled solely by a free-floating best-interests inquiry.
- The court held that the statutory standards governing parental fitness and the need for parental consent control adoption proceedings and must be applied before an adoption may be sustained over a parent’s objection.
- The court concluded that the trial court’s finding of unfitness could not stand where the father’s lack of involvement during the initial period after birth was the product of deception and concealment that prevented him from knowing the child was alive and available to be parented.
- The court reversed the judgment upholding the adoption and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the proper statutory framework.

## Legal Principles

- Adoption is a statutory process; courts must apply the Adoption Act’s requirements for consent and for dispensing with consent through a valid finding of unfitness.
- A “best interests of the child” analysis does not replace the statutory prerequisites for terminating or bypassing a biological parent’s rights in an adoption.
- When evaluating an unwed father’s “interest, concern, or responsibility” shortly after birth, courts must consider whether the father had a fair opportunity to act; concealment or misrepresentation that blocks the father from learning the child’s status can defeat a finding of unfitness based on inaction.
- A finding that a parent’s consent is unnecessary must rest on clear statutory grounds supported by the record, not on generalized views about who the child should live with.

## Conclusion

In re Doe held that an adoption cannot be sustained merely because the child has bonded with adoptive parents or because a court believes the placement is best for the child; the Adoption Act requires a valid basis to proceed without the biological father’s consent. Because the mother’s concealment and false statement that the baby had died prevented the father from demonstrating involvement during the early post-birth period, the supreme court reversed the unfitness-based approval of the adoption and sent the case back for proceedings applying the correct statutory standards.


In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994)