## Facts

- Phyllis Lee Baird died intestate on December 29, 1994, leaving two children (James and Julie) and two grandchildren through James (Jayme and Hunter).
- Phyllis became mentally incapacitated due to Alzheimer’s disease; a guardian was appointed in 1988 (Susan Saulsbury, later Susan Baird).
- James married Susan in 1992 and later assaulted her; on March 8, 1994, James was convicted of first-degree assault.
- On the same day as his conviction, James executed and filed, in Phyllis’s guardianship proceeding, a written instrument purporting to disclaim “any and all interest” he “may have” in Phyllis’s estate, although Phyllis was still alive.
- In October 1994, Susan obtained a $2.75 million personal-injury judgment against James; James filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy shortly thereafter.
- After Phyllis’s death, her estate exceeded $500,000; James’s intestate share was a substantial potential bankruptcy asset.
- Jayme and Hunter petitioned the probate court to declare James’s disclaimer valid so they would take in his place; the bankruptcy trustee and creditors opposed, seeking to include James’s intestate share in the bankruptcy estate.

## Issues

1. Whether RCW 11.86 authorizes an anticipatory disclaimer of a prospective heir’s expectancy in a living person’s intestate estate.
2. Whether a disclaimer executed before the decedent’s death can be effective when the intestate interest arises only upon death.

## Decision

- The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the probate court’s order declaring the disclaimer invalid.
- The court held RCW 11.86 does not authorize disclaimers of mere expectancies in an intestate estate before the intestate’s death.
- Because James had no present property interest at the time of execution, the disclaimer had no legal effect on his later-arising intestate share.

## Legal Principles

- Intestate property interests arise at the intestate’s death; before death, a would-be heir holds only an expectancy.
- Under RCW 11.86, a statutory disclaimer requires an existing property interest held by a person “entitled to receive” that interest; a pre-death expectancy is not such an interest.
- Courts will not expand the disclaimer statute beyond its text to permit anticipatory disclaimers not contemplated by the statutory scheme.

## Conclusion

RCW 11.86 permits disclaimers of present property interests, including interests created by intestacy once they exist, but it does not permit a person to disclaim an intestate expectancy before the decedent’s death; accordingly, James’s pre-death disclaimer was ineffective and could not divert his intestate share to his children.


In re Estate of Baird, 131 Wash. 2d 514, 933 P.2d 1031 (Wash. 1997)