## Facts

- William Bonardi’s will created two testamentary trusts: (1) a trust for his widow, Donna, with remainder to their daughters, and (2) a separate trust for the daughters with delayed access to principal until age 25.
- Under the first trust, Donna was the lifetime income beneficiary; principal could be distributed to her only if necessary, and the trustee was directed to preserve principal for the daughters at Donna’s death.
- The will expressed concerns about Donna’s drinking and the risk that the estate could benefit a future boyfriend or spouse; it also stated the income was supplemental because Donna was expected to work.
- After William’s death, Donna petitioned to terminate the first trust and receive the principal outright.
- The daughters, then approximately 18 and 20, signed written waivers/renunciations of their future remainder interests to facilitate Donna’s receipt of the corpus.
- The Chancery Division terminated the first trust and ordered distribution of principal to Donna, apparently assuming all beneficiaries were over 21 and treating their consent as sufficient.
- The executor/trustee appealed, asserting the termination violated the testator’s expressed intent and defeated the trust’s purpose.

## Issues

1. Whether a testamentary trust may be terminated and its principal distributed to the income beneficiary based on beneficiary consent and waivers, despite will provisions directing preservation of principal for remainder beneficiaries.
2. Whether early termination would defeat a material purpose of the trust, including protective and postponement purposes reflected in the trust terms and the will’s stated concerns.
3. Whether the daughters’ renunciations could validly support termination where the will postponed their control of principal until a specified age.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division reversed the order terminating the first trust.
- It held that distributing the first trust’s principal outright to Donna was improper because it contravened the testator’s expressed intent and defeated a material purpose of the trust.
- The first trust was to continue under its original terms; the principal was not to be distributed to Donna contrary to the will’s limitations.

## Legal Principles

- A court’s central task in trust administration is to effectuate the testator’s intent as expressed in the will and trust terms, as informed by admissible extrinsic evidence when appropriate.
- Beneficiary consent does not justify terminating or modifying a trust where the proposed change would frustrate or defeat a material purpose of the trust.
- Protective and postponement features—such as limiting invasion of principal, preserving corpus for remainder beneficiaries, and delaying beneficiaries’ access to principal until a specified age—can constitute material purposes that bar early termination.
- Waivers or renunciations by remainder beneficiaries cannot be used to convert a limited, purpose-driven testamentary trust into an outright distribution when doing so would nullify the plan reflected in the instrument.

## Conclusion

The court reinstated the first testamentary trust, ruling that beneficiary consent and renunciations could not support termination where the will showed a material purpose to provide only supplemental support to the widow while preserving principal for the daughters under specified conditions and timing.


In re Estate of Bonardi, 376 N.J. Super. 508, 871 A.2d 103 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)