## Facts

- George Robert Campbell executed a will in September 1994 and died shortly thereafter; the will was admitted to probate in November 1994.
- The will granted his surviving spouse, Wilma J. Campbell, most assets and created a life estate for her in the family residence near Issaquah, Washington, with the remainder to his six adult children from a prior marriage.
- The will stated Wilma was to have “undisturbed possession of the house and land … so long as she wishes to live there,” and it acknowledged potential conflict between Wilma and the children.
- The will also gave Wilma an option, if she did not wish to remain on the property, to require the children to pay her one-third of the value of the house and a one-acre lot, with valuation set by appraisers selected by the parties.
- Contrary to typical common-law allocations, the will required the children to pay “all expenses associated with the life estate property,” including taxes and insurance.
- The children petitioned for a determination that (a) Wilma’s life estate ended if she moved out and (b) the expense-shifting provision was unenforceable.
- After a bench trial, the superior court ruled for Wilma on both issues; the children appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the will’s “so long as she wishes to live there” language limited Wilma’s life estate to occupancy, terminating the estate if she moved out.
2. Whether a will may validly require remaindermen to pay expenses (including taxes and insurance) associated with property subject to a life estate.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed.
- Wilma’s life estate did not terminate upon moving from the property; it continued until her death.
- The “so long as she wishes to live there” clause addressed Wilma’s right to exclusive, undisturbed possession while she chose to live there, not a condition cutting short the life estate.
- The will’s requirement that the children pay expenses associated with the life-estate property was valid and enforceable.

## Legal Principles

- A court construing a will seeks to ascertain and effectuate the testator’s intent from the instrument as a whole and harmonizes provisions rather than allowing isolated phrases to negate an express grant.
- An express testamentary grant of a “life estate” will not be treated as terminated by non-occupancy absent clear language creating a condition subsequent or other limitation on duration.
- Default rules placing ordinary life-estate expenses on the life tenant (including taxes and insurance) are subject to alteration by clear testamentary direction.
- Absent a statutory prohibition or public-policy bar, a testator may shift financial obligations associated with life-estate property to remaindermen.

## Conclusion

The court enforced the will as written, holding that Wilma’s life estate endured until her death regardless of whether she continued to reside in the home and that the children, as remaindermen, could be required to pay taxes, insurance, and other expenses associated with the life-estate property.


In re Estate of Campbell, 87 Wash. App. 506, 942 P.2d 1008 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)