## Facts

- Jeffrey M. Johnson and Laurel M. Christensen married in 2000.
- In 2001, Johnson bought a life-insurance policy naming Christensen as primary beneficiary and his mother, Judith E. Johnson, as contingent beneficiary.
- The policy required written notice to the insurer to change or remove beneficiaries.
- The policy further provided that if no designated beneficiary was living at the insured’s death, the insurer would pay proceeds to the owner if living, otherwise to the owner’s estate.
- Judith E. Johnson (the contingent beneficiary) died in 2006.
- Johnson and Christensen divorced in 2008. Their separation agreement, incorporated into the decree, released any claims Christensen had to Johnson’s life-insurance policy.
- Johnson did not submit any written change-of-beneficiary form to the insurer after the divorce, and Christensen remained the listed beneficiary on the policy when Johnson died on May 18, 2010.
- Johnson had no surviving children or parents at death; he had at least one sibling.
- Johnson’s sister, Dawn Wilson, was appointed personal representative of the estate in June 2010.
- Christensen filed a claim seeking the policy proceeds as the named beneficiary; the estate opposed the claim under Colorado’s revocation-on-divorce statute.

## Issues

1. Whether C.R.S. § 15-11-804(2) revoked Christensen’s beneficiary designation upon divorce even though the insurance policy required written notice to the insurer to change beneficiaries.
2. Whether C.R.S. § 15-11-806 could be used to reform the beneficiary designation after Johnson’s death to restore Christensen as beneficiary, given the statute’s effective date.

## Decision

- The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed partial summary judgment for the estate, holding that Christensen’s status as beneficiary was revoked by operation of C.R.S. § 15-11-804(2) upon the 2008 divorce.
- The court rejected Christensen’s argument that the policy’s contractual change-of-beneficiary procedure (written notice to the insurer) prevented statutory revocation, reasoning that a former spouse’s interest as a beneficiary is an expectancy that state law may revoke upon divorce.
- Because Christensen was treated as having predeceased Johnson for purposes of the governing instrument, and no other living designated beneficiary remained, the policy’s default provision directed payment to Johnson’s estate.
- The court affirmed dismissal of Christensen’s reformation claims, concluding the trial court correctly declined to apply C.R.S. § 15-11-806 because it became effective after Johnson’s death and could not be used to revive a designation already revoked under § 15-11-804(2).
- Accordingly, Christensen took nothing from the policy, and the proceeds were payable to the estate.

## Legal Principles

- Under C.R.S. § 15-11-804(2), divorce revokes provisions in a “governing instrument” that benefit a former spouse, including a life-insurance beneficiary designation, unless an exception applies (such as terms in the instrument, a court order, or an agreement addressing the designation).
- Statutory revocation on divorce operates by law and can change the legal effect of a beneficiary designation even if the policy sets out procedures for the insured to make a voluntary change through the insurer.
- A named beneficiary’s interest in a revocable beneficiary designation is an expectancy rather than a fixed entitlement before the insured’s death, and the legislature may set default rules affecting that expectancy after divorce.
- When an ex-spouse is revoked under § 15-11-804(2), the instrument is applied as though the ex-spouse failed to survive the decedent, which can trigger the policy’s contingent-beneficiary or default-to-estate provisions.
- A later-enacted reformation statute (C.R.S. § 15-11-806) is not applied to deaths occurring before its effective date, and it cannot be used to reinstate an ex-spouse’s revoked beneficiary status in these circumstances.

## Conclusion

The court held that Johnson’s 2008 divorce automatically revoked Christensen’s beneficiary designation under C.R.S. § 15-11-804(2) despite the policy’s written-notice requirement, leaving no living designated beneficiary at Johnson’s death and causing the proceeds to pass to the estate under the policy’s default clause; the court also held that C.R.S. § 15-11-806 could not be applied after Johnson’s death to reform the designation and restore Christensen as beneficiary.


In re Estate of Johnson, 304 P.3d 614 (2012)