## Facts

- Mildred B. Murphy had one child, Arthur, who was raised by Jim E. and Mae Manning and known as Clair Willard Manning.
- Clair was adopted by the Mannings in 1944, when he was 19; Clair and Mildred later reestablished their relationship.
- In 1998, Mildred executed a will giving Clair a Keuka Lake cottage, $8,000, and one-half of the residuary estate, and also made cash gifts to two of Clair’s children.
- The other half of the residuary estate was left to Mildred’s sister-in-law, Evelyn Beckman, after certain cash gifts to Beckman’s relatives.
- Clair died in 2001 leaving four children; Mildred died in 2002.
- The executors sought construction of the will to determine whether the gifts to Clair lapsed or passed to his children under EPTL 3-3.3 (anti-lapse).
- The Surrogate’s Court, affirmed by the Appellate Division, held the gifts lapsed based on DRL § 117(2), treating Clair as a stranger to Mildred’s birth family.

## Issues

1. Whether EPTL 3-3.3 preserves a testamentary gift from a birth parent to a child adopted out of the birth family when the child predeceases the testator and leaves surviving issue.
2. Whether DRL § 117(2) requires treating an adopted-out child as a “stranger” for will-construction purposes so as to defeat application of EPTL 3-3.3 to a direct, named bequest.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals reversed.
- EPTL 3-3.3 applied to Mildred’s bequests to Clair, so the gifts did not lapse and passed to Clair’s issue.
- DRL § 117(2) did not bar application of the anti-lapse statute to a direct bequest from a birth parent to an adopted-out child who was expressly named and identified by relationship.
- The case was remitted for further proceedings consistent with distributing the gifts to Clair’s children.

## Legal Principles

- Under EPTL 3-3.3, a disposition to a testator’s child that would otherwise lapse is preserved for the child’s surviving issue unless the will indicates a contrary intention.
- DRL § 117(2)’s adoption-based severance rules primarily address status and inheritance consequences that arise by operation of law (including intestacy and certain class-gift problems) and do not automatically defeat an express, specific testamentary gift by a birth parent to an adopted-out child.
- When a will specifically names an adopted-out child and reflects recognition of the parent-child relationship, courts construe the statutory scheme to effectuate that expressed intent and to apply the anti-lapse statute absent a contrary will provision.

## Conclusion

The court held that a birth mother’s will making direct, named gifts to her adopted-out son fell within EPTL 3-3.3’s protection, so the bequests did not lapse on the son’s prior death and instead passed to his surviving children; DRL § 117(2) did not require a contrary result.


In re Estate of Murphy, 6 N.Y.3d 36, 843 N.E.2d 140, 809 N.Y.S.2d 500 (N.Y. 2005)