## Facts

- Leo August Rehwinkel executed a will in 1968 containing a residuary clause distributing “the entire residue of my estate” to specified relatives “to those of the following who are living at the time of my death, share and share alike.”
- The named residuary beneficiaries included Rehwinkel’s niece, Helene (Helen) Anderson.
- Rehwinkel died in 1991; Anderson died about one month before him.
- Anderson’s son, Ronald Fossum, survived Rehwinkel and sought to take Anderson’s share under Washington’s anti-lapse statute, RCW 11.12.110.
- The estate argued that the will’s survivorship requirement showed intent to exclude anti-lapse substitution.
- The trial court granted summary judgment to the estate and dismissed Fossum’s petition.

## Issues

1. Whether RCW 11.12.110 substitutes the issue of a predeceased residuary beneficiary when the will limits the gift to those beneficiaries “living at the time of my death.”
2. Whether the will’s survivorship language constitutes sufficiently clear contrary testamentary intent to prevent application of the anti-lapse statute.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the estate.
- The court held that the anti-lapse statute did not apply because the will’s phrase “to those of the following who are living at the time of my death” expressed a clear intent that only survivors take under the residuary clause.
- Because Anderson did not satisfy the survivorship condition, her residuary interest lapsed and did not pass to Fossum.

## Legal Principles

- Will interpretation is a question of law; the court’s primary duty is to effectuate the testator’s intent, derived when possible from the will’s language read as a whole.
- On review of summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same inquiry as the trial court when material facts are undisputed.
- Washington’s anti-lapse statute, RCW 11.12.110, is presumed to apply, but yields where the will indicates contrary intent.
- The party opposing anti-lapse bears the burden to show the testator clearly intended the statute not apply.
- Express survivorship language (e.g., distribution to beneficiaries “living at the time of my death”) establishes a condition of taking and is sufficient to show contrary intent defeating anti-lapse substitution.

## Conclusion

The court enforced the residuary clause’s survivorship condition, concluding it clearly required named beneficiaries to survive the testator; that expressed intent rebutted the presumption favoring RCW 11.12.110, so the predeceased beneficiary’s child did not take her share.


In re Estate of Rehwinkel, 71 Wash. App. 827, 862 P.2d 639 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)