## Facts

- Lorenzo B. Wright, a Venice, California resident, executed a will about sixteen months before his death (May 2, 1933).
- The will left Wright’s Venice house at 722 Nowita Place and substantially all personal property and valuables to Charlotte Josephine Hindmarch (a friend), and the Venice house at 724 Nowita Place to his daughter, Maud Wright Angell.
- The will left Wright’s interest in property or an estate in Salt Lake City, Utah, to his granddaughter, Marjorie Jean Angell, and made $1 bequests to several other relatives or acquaintances.
- The estate consisted primarily of two improved Venice parcels and the Utah interest, with minimal personal property; total value was alleged not to exceed $10,000.
- Hindmarch petitioned to admit the will to probate; Angell contested, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence.
- The probate court rejected undue influence but denied probate, finding Wright lacked testamentary capacity when he executed the will.
- Evidence offered to show incapacity emphasized Wright’s eccentric acts and odd behavior; notably, the will’s drafter (a notary/realtor) and the two subscribing witnesses expressed opinions that Wright was of unsound mind, largely based on long-standing impressions and trivial observations.
- Hindmarch appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the incapacity finding.

## Issues

1. Whether substantial evidence supported the probate court’s finding that Wright lacked testamentary capacity at the time of will execution.
2. How the presumption of sanity and the contestant’s burden of proof operate in a will contest alleging lack of testamentary capacity, including the role of attestation by subscribing witnesses.

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment and order denying probate.
- The court held the evidence did not establish lack of testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed.
- The court directed that the will be admitted to probate on remand.

## Legal Principles

- Testamentary capacity is presumed; the contestant bears the burden to prove incapacity at the time of execution.
- Eccentricity, isolated acts, idiosyncrasies, or moral or mental irregularities do not defeat capacity unless they directly bear on and influence the testamentary act.
- Opinion testimony (including from the drafter and subscribing witnesses) is insufficient where grounded in trivialities or general impressions rather than concrete proof of mental derangement affecting the will-making decision.
- Attestation strengthens the presumption of capacity; subscribing witnesses have a responsibility to satisfy themselves of the testator’s competency before attesting, but their later, weakly supported opinions do not alone overcome the presumption.
- A coherent, intelligible testamentary scheme may support a finding of capacity absent evidence of delusions or mental conditions that controlled the dispositive choices.

## Conclusion

The court required time-specific, causally connected proof that a mental condition impaired the testator’s understanding of the will-making act; generalized evidence of odd behavior and weak opinion testimony did not overcome the presumption of sanity, so the will was ordered admitted to probate.


In re Estate of Wright, 7 Cal. 2d 348, 60 P.2d 434 (Cal. 1936)