## Facts

- Ernest Hargrove married Aimee Neresheimer in 1899, and two children were born during the marriage.
- After several years, Neresheimer sought a divorce on grounds of cruelty; in the divorce proceedings she admitted under oath that Hargrove had twice accused her of infidelity.
- Neresheimer’s father and the father’s attorney, Smith, were involved in advising during the divorce.
- Shortly after the divorce, Smith divorced his own wife and married Neresheimer, which Hargrove treated as support for his suspicion that Neresheimer and Smith had been having an affair.
- Hargrove later petitioned to vacate the divorce based on alleged adultery between Neresheimer and Smith; in an affidavit in that proceeding, Hargrove stated that the effect of the divorce on his children was his main concern. The petition was denied.
- Hargrove moved to New York, became successful in business, and remained separated from Neresheimer and the children.
- For decades, neither Neresheimer nor the children communicated with Hargrove.
- Before his death, Hargrove executed a will leaving his estate to Mrs. Clement Griscom, the widow of a valued business associate, rather than to the two children.
- Around the same period, Hargrove executed an affidavit stating that Neresheimer had told him he was not the father of the two children.
- The children contested the will, arguing that Hargrove’s belief about their paternity was an insane delusion that prevented him from knowing the proper objects of his bounty and therefore destroyed testamentary capacity.
- The jury found for the contestants, and the Surrogate’s Court denied probate. Mrs. Griscom, as proponent, appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the testator’s belief that the children born during his marriage were not his—given the surrounding circumstances and his claimed conversation with his former wife—was an insane delusion that negated testamentary capacity and required denial of probate.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division reversed the decree denying probate.
- The court held that the evidence showed some rational basis for Hargrove’s belief about nonpaternity; therefore, the belief was not an insane delusion within the meaning of the law of wills.
- The will was ordered admitted to probate.

## Legal Principles

- Testamentary capacity requires that, at the time of execution, the testator understand that he is making a will, know in a general way the nature and extent of his property, and recognize the persons who ordinarily would be expected to share in his estate.
- An “insane delusion” in the probate setting is a fixed false belief that is the product of mental disorder and is without any foundation in fact; it is more than a mistake, suspicion, prejudice, or unreasonable inference.
- A mistaken belief does not defeat testamentary capacity when there is some rational factual basis for the belief, even if that basis is slight and even if the belief later appears wrong.
- When the record shows circumstances that can explain the testator’s belief (such as conduct surrounding a divorce, subsequent remarriage to a suspected paramour, and the testator’s sworn statements), the belief may be treated as an error rather than a delusion.
- Although juries decide disputed facts and credibility, an appellate court may set aside a verdict denying probate when, as a matter of law, the proven circumstances do not meet the legal standard for an insane delusion.

## Conclusion

The Appellate Division ordered probate because Hargrove’s belief that the contestants were not his children was not a legally cognizable insane delusion: the divorce history, the former wife’s rapid remarriage to Smith, and Hargrove’s sworn statements supplied at least some rational support for his view, leaving him free to disinherit the children without the will being invalidated for lack of testamentary capacity.


In re Hargrove's Will, 262 A.D. 202, 28 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1942)