## Facts

- Direct purchasers of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) sued major HFCS manufacturers under Sherman Act § 1, alleging a price-fixing conspiracy lasting roughly 1989 to mid-1995.
- The market was concentrated and oligopolistic, involving a standardized commodity (HFCS 42 and HFCS 55) sold to large and small buyers; defendants accounted for most production.
- Plaintiffs alleged defendants maintained supracompetitive prices despite substantial excess capacity that would ordinarily create incentives to cut prices to expand output.
- Plaintiffs pointed to extensive inter-seller transactions (manufacturers buying HFCS from each other and reselling it) as behavior inconsistent with ordinary competition for sales.
- Plaintiffs alleged a “90 percent rule” under which large customers were expected to buy about 90% of their requirements from one producer, stabilizing shares and reducing competition for rivals’ customers.
- Plaintiffs offered documentary and testimonial evidence of executive statements about not undercutting prices, industry “rules,” and frequent contacts among competitors (including trade-association interactions and informal meetings).
- After discovery, the district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding the evidence insufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find an unlawful agreement rather than lawful parallel conduct.
- Plaintiffs appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether plaintiffs’ combined economic evidence and “plus factors,” together with noneconomic evidence and reasonable inferences, was sufficient for a jury to infer an explicit price-fixing agreement under Sherman Act § 1.
2. Whether the district court improperly resolved competing inferences and credibility questions at the summary-judgment stage in an antitrust conspiracy case.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for trial.
- The court held that a reasonable jury could infer an explicit agreement to fix prices from the totality of the circumstantial evidence.
- The court concluded the district court erred by treating defendants’ competing explanations as dispositive and by effectively weighing evidence and credibility rather than leaving those matters to a jury.

## Legal Principles

- A Sherman Act § 1 agreement may be proven through circumstantial evidence; direct evidence is not required.
- Parallel pricing in an oligopoly, standing alone, may reflect lawful conscious parallelism; liability requires evidence permitting an inference of an explicit agreement (“plus factors”).
- On summary judgment, courts must view the record in the nonmovant’s favor and may not choose between competing reasonable inferences or decide credibility disputes.
- Evidence that conduct is difficult to explain as independent self-interest in a competitive market (e.g., market-share stability despite excess capacity, inter-seller sales, customer-allocation practices) can support an inference of conspiracy when considered cumulatively.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs produced enough circumstantial evidence—market structure plus “plus factors” and corroborating non-economic proof—to permit a jury to find an explicit HFCS price-fixing agreement, making summary judgment improper and requiring a trial.


In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002)