## Facts

- Isaac J.R., a fifth-grade student, accumulated 15 days recorded as unexcused absences during the first semester under the local school board’s attendance policy.
- Seven of the 15 unexcused absences were days Isaac was not in school because he was suspended for disciplinary reasons.
- The school board’s written policy listed specific excused absences (e.g., illness, medical appointments, family emergencies, planned vacations) but did not treat disciplinary suspension as an excused absence.
- The State filed a juvenile petition alleging Isaac was a “habitual truant,” supporting a determination that he was a child in need of protection or services.

## Issues

1. Whether days a pupil is absent due to school-imposed suspension may be counted as days “absent from school without an acceptable excuse” when determining habitual truancy under Wis. Stat. § 118.16(1)(a).

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s habitual-truancy finding and the resulting child-in-need-of-protection-or-services determination.
- The court held that suspension-related absences may be counted toward habitual truancy under Wis. Stat. § 118.16(1)(a).
- The court treated the question as statutory interpretation reviewed de novo and applied the statute’s plain language.

## Legal Principles

- Under Wis. Stat. § 118.16(1)(a), “habitual truant” means a pupil absent without an acceptable excuse under Wis. Stat. § 118.15 for part or all of at least five school days in a semester.
- Because Wis. Stat. § 118.15 does not list disciplinary suspension as an acceptable excuse from attendance, absence caused by suspension is “without an acceptable excuse” for purposes of § 118.16(1)(a).
- When statutory language is unambiguous, courts apply the text as written and do not rely on legislative history or policy arguments to narrow the statute.
- Arguments that the statutory result is undesirable or may invite misuse by schools are for the legislature where the statutory text is clear.

## Conclusion

The court held that suspension days count as unexcused absences under the habitual-truancy statute because suspension is not an acceptable excuse under the attendance-excuse statute, and it affirmed the juvenile court’s habitual-truancy-based disposition.


In re Interest of Isaac J.R., 220 Wis. 2d 252, 582 N.W.2d 476 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998)