## Facts

- Sherri J. Jefferson, an assistant public defender, represented a juvenile in delinquency proceedings in Glynn County Juvenile Court.
- During trial, Jefferson repeatedly challenged the court’s evidentiary rulings, particularly hearsay rulings limiting cross-examination tied to the alleged shooter’s statements.
- The juvenile court judge viewed eight in-court statements (and Jefferson’s tone and demeanor) as disparaging the court and issued a contempt citation.
- The original judge recused; a different judge conducted a contempt hearing using testimony and the trial transcript.
- The second judge found two of the eight statements to be criminal contempt for allegedly impugning the court’s impartiality and undermining its authority, sentencing Jefferson to a total of 30 days’ incarceration and a $500 fine.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed in a divided decision; the Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to clarify the standard for attorney in-court speech contempt.

## Issues

1. What standard governs whether an attorney’s in-court statements may be punished as criminal contempt consistent with constitutional limits.
2. Whether Jefferson’s statements posed a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice.
3. Whether Jefferson knew, or reasonably should have known, that her statements exceeded the outermost limits of proper advocacy.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the criminal contempt judgment and remanded with direction.
- The Court held that in-court speech may support criminal contempt only if it creates a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice.
- The Court further held that an attorney may be punished for contempt based on courtroom statements only where the attorney knows, or reasonably should know, that she is exceeding the outermost limits of her proper role as an advocate.
- Applying these standards, the Court concluded the record did not support criminal contempt sanctions for Jefferson’s statements.

## Legal Principles

- Georgia courts possess inherent contempt power to protect their jurisdiction and effectuate judgments, but its use is constrained by constitutional protections for speech and due process.
- Disrespectful, offensive, or critical courtroom speech is not enough; the speech must present a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice.
- Attorney-speech contempt requires that the attorney’s conduct be so clearly beyond professional bounds that the attorney knew, or a reasonable attorney would have known, it exceeded the outermost limits of proper advocacy.
- Contempt cannot be used to suppress vigorous advocacy, including persistent objections and arguments about fairness, absent a qualifying threat to the court’s ability to conduct proceedings.

## Conclusion

The Georgia Supreme Court vacated Jefferson’s criminal contempt sanctions, holding that contempt for attorney in-court speech requires a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice and statements that clearly exceed the outermost limits of advocacy as known (or knowable) to reasonable counsel.


In re Jefferson, 657 S.E.2d 830 (Ga. 2008)