## Facts

- Police conducted a narcotics interdiction operation at a Washington, D.C. bus station around 2:30 a.m. after a bus arrived from New York City.
- Officers in plain clothes boarded the bus and used the public-address system to announce they were a “drug interdiction group” interviewing passengers from New York as a source city for drugs.
- Detective Donald Zattau approached J.M., age 14, asked about his travel, requested his ticket, and confirmed J.M. heard and understood the announcement.
- Zattau asked whether J.M. had weapons or drugs; J.M. said no.
- J.M. permitted a search of his carry-on bag; no contraband was found.
- Zattau then requested permission to pat down J.M.’s person; Zattau testified J.M. consented.
- During the pat-down, Zattau felt a hard object, lifted J.M.’s shirt, and found a plastic bag containing crack cocaine.
- In the delinquency proceeding, J.M. moved to suppress the cocaine as the product of an unconstitutional search; the trial court denied the motion, finding voluntary consent.
- J.M. was adjudicated delinquent for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and appealed the suppression ruling.

## Issues

1. Whether the government proved by clear and convincing evidence that J.M.’s consent to a pat-down search was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, including his age.
2. Whether the trial court made sufficiently explicit findings—particularly as to the effect of J.M.’s youth—to permit meaningful appellate review of voluntariness.

## Decision

- The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, did not decide whether the search was constitutional.
- The court remanded for the trial judge to make explicit findings on the key factual issue: how J.M.’s age (14) affected the voluntariness of his consent to the search of his person.
- The court reserved judgment on the suppression question pending those findings and did not order suppression or otherwise set aside the adjudication on the existing record.

## Legal Principles

- Consent to search under the Fourth Amendment must be voluntary, assessed under the totality of the circumstances.
- In the District of Columbia, the government bears the burden to prove voluntariness of consent by clear and convincing evidence.
- A suspect’s age, particularly when the suspect is a juvenile, may materially affect whether apparent assent reflects a free choice or mere submission to authority.
- Appellate deference to trial-level voluntariness determinations depends on sufficiently specific findings demonstrating that material circumstances were considered; when findings are inadequate, remand for clarification is appropriate.

## Conclusion

The en banc court required explicit trial-court findings on how a 14-year-old’s youth affected the voluntariness of consent to a pat-down during a bus interdiction encounter, remanding because the existing record did not allow proper review of the Fourth Amendment consent determination.


In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497 (D.C. 1992)