## Facts

- In 1998, Hugo Chávez won Venezuela’s presidential election and backed replacing the 1962 constitutional order through a newly elected assembly.
- In 1999, a constituent assembly was elected and began restructuring state institutions during the constitutional change.
- The assembly issued a decree claiming power to abolish government institutions and dismiss public officials.
- Relying on that asserted authority, the assembly issued a separate decree declaring a “judicial emergency.”
- The judicial-emergency decree created a body known as the Judicial Emergency Commission.
- The commission was tasked with investigating members of the judiciary for corruption and determining whether they should remain in office or be dismissed.
- The commission’s mandate extended to judges at multiple levels, including the justices of the Supreme Court of Venezuela.
- The Supreme Court of Venezuela issued a decree in response to the assembly’s judicial-emergency decree and the creation of the Judicial Emergency Commission.

## Issues

1. Whether a constituent assembly, acting by decree during constitutional replacement, may declare a judicial emergency and create a commission with authority to investigate and remove judges, including Supreme Court justices.
2. Whether, and to what extent, the Supreme Court may assess the legal effect of such constituent-assembly decrees on the judiciary.
3. What minimum procedural and institutional guarantees must govern any investigation or removal of judges in a judicial reorganization.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court issued an institutional decree reacting to the constituent assembly’s judicial-emergency measure and the establishment of the Judicial Emergency Commission.
- The Court treated the dispute as arising from the ongoing constitutional transformation and addressed the relationship between the constituent assembly’s claimed authority and the continued operation of the judiciary.
- The Court indicated that efforts to investigate corruption and reorganize the judiciary could not be implemented as unlimited powers that dispense with legal constraints on judicial tenure.
- The Court stated that any process targeting judges’ continuation in office must provide basic procedural protections, including a meaningful opportunity to defend against accusations.
- The Court emphasized that judicial reorganization measures must be compatible with judicial independence and the continued functioning of the judiciary as an institution.

## Legal Principles

- Constituent-assembly authority exercised during constitutional change may be recognized as politically and legally significant, but it is not a blank check to remove judges without legally constrained procedures.
- Judicial independence and the stability of judicial tenure are structural requirements that limit the methods by which judges may be investigated and dismissed.
- A judge-facing investigative or removal process must include due process protections, including notice of allegations and a real opportunity to respond.
- Emergency or transitional commissions aimed at judicial reform must operate within rule-of-law limits so that anticorruption goals do not become tools for discretionary removal.

## Conclusion

In *In re Judicial Reorganization Decree, ACP-23081999 (1999)*, the Supreme Court of Venezuela responded to the constituent assembly’s judicial-emergency decree that created a commission to investigate and potentially dismiss judges, including the justices themselves, and the Court signaled that judicial reorganization—however framed during constitutional transition—must still respect due process and judicial independence.
