## Facts

- A mother of six minor children had received child-protective services for several years; a caseworker described the home as “marginal” but reported the children were not abused or neglected and had a warm relationship with their mother.
- On September 4, 1979, the mother’s nine-month-old infant died suddenly; the cause of death was uncertain, and superficial marks were later found unrelated to the death.
- The next day, the child-protection agency took the remaining children into emergency custody under a statute permitting a short-term seizure when a child is in “immediate physical danger.”
- The agency then filed neglect petitions and sought continued temporary custody based on the infant’s unexplained death and conditions and allegations including an unclean apartment with roaches, the mother’s alcohol use, a report the children were once left alone overnight, and instances of children going to school without breakfast.
- After an ex parte temporary custody order, the court held a prompt hearing where a pediatrician testified there were no internal injuries and the death was consistent with illness and possible SIDS; the caseworker testified about home conditions and alcohol concerns.
- The trial court found probable cause that the children were in immediate physical danger and continued temporary custody with the Commissioner.
- The mother appealed, challenging the statute’s constitutionality and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting continued removal.

## Issues

1. Whether the temporary custody statutes, authorizing emergency seizure and continued temporary custody, violate due process by infringing the constitutional right to family integrity.
2. Whether the statutory standard “immediate physical danger” is unconstitutionally vague.
3. Whether the evidence at the temporary custody hearing established probable cause that the children faced “immediate physical danger” sufficient to justify continued removal.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Connecticut held the statutory scheme constitutional when narrowly construed to require a high threshold of danger before emergency removal.
- The court rejected the vagueness challenge, concluding that the narrowed construction provided adequate guidance and notice.
- The court reversed the trial court’s order continuing temporary custody because the evidence did not show serious physical illness, serious physical injury, or immediate physical danger to the remaining children.

## Legal Principles

- Parents and children have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in family integrity; state interference must be strictly limited and carefully scrutinized.
- Emergency removal and continued temporary custody require a fact-based showing of “serious physical illness, or serious physical injury, or immediate physical danger,” not generalized concern or speculation.
- Statutes affecting family integrity may be construed narrowly to avoid due process and vagueness problems, and courts must apply the substantive threshold rigorously at temporary custody hearings.
- Poverty, marginal living conditions, or non-ideal parenting conditions, without evidence of imminent serious physical harm, do not justify emergency removal.

## Conclusion

The court sustained Connecticut’s emergency child-removal framework by construing it to require proof of imminent serious physical harm, but it reversed the continued temporary custody order because the record showed at most a marginal home environment and an unexplained infant death, not probable cause of immediate physical danger to the remaining children.


In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 455 A.2d 1313 (Conn. 1983)