## Facts

- Manuel R., age 15, was placed on one year of juvenile probation after a burglary adjudication; probation required school attendance and compliance with school rules.
- A probation officer later filed a delinquency petition alleging probation violations based on truancy and bringing a radio to school contrary to school rules, and sought detention.
- At detention hearings, Manuel was represented by appointed counsel; the probation department urged detention, citing an alleged assault on Manuel’s mother.
- Manuel admitted the probation-violation allegations and was adjudicated delinquent; disposition was continued.
- At a later hearing, the court proceeded to disposition on the earlier adjudication while Manuel and his mother expressed dissatisfaction with appointed counsel; the mother offered to represent him.
- After the court stated it would not appoint substitute counsel, the mother purported to waive Manuel’s right to counsel, and Manuel appeared to acquiesce.
- The court held the dispositional hearing without an attorney for Manuel and committed him to the Department of Children and Youth Services for two years, with placement at Long Lane School.
- Manuel appealed the dispositional order.

## Issues

1. Whether a child under sixteen is per se incompetent to waive the right to counsel in a juvenile delinquency proceeding.
2. Whether the record showed that Manuel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived counsel at the dispositional hearing.

## Decision

- The court held that juveniles under sixteen are not categorically incapable of waiving counsel; competency is determined case by case.
- The court held the waiver was invalid because the state did not establish a knowing and voluntary waiver on this record.
- The court set aside the dispositional order and remanded for a new dispositional hearing.

## Legal Principles

- A child charged with delinquency has a statutory right to counsel, reinforced by due process concerns when the state seeks a secure commitment.
- No per se rule bars waiver of counsel by a juvenile under sixteen; the validity of waiver depends on the individual juvenile’s capacity and the circumstances.
- The state bears the burden to prove waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
- The trial court must conduct a careful on-the-record canvass tailored to juveniles, addressing the nature of the proceeding, the function and advantages of counsel, and the potential consequences of disposition.
- A parent’s attempted waiver cannot substitute for the juvenile’s personal, informed waiver, particularly where parental interests may diverge from the child’s.
- A juvenile’s passive acquiescence or silence, without an adequate colloquy demonstrating comprehension and voluntariness, is insufficient to waive counsel.

## Conclusion

The court declined to adopt a categorical rule that children under sixteen cannot waive counsel, but vacated the commitment because the trial court accepted a parental waiver and the juvenile’s acquiescence without an adequate inquiry establishing the juvenile’s own knowing and voluntary waiver, requiring a new dispositional hearing.


In re Manuel R., 207 Conn. 725, 543 A.2d 719 (Conn. 1988)