## Facts

- Susann (“Sun”) Margreth Bonds and Barry Lamar Bonds began a relationship in 1987 and became engaged shortly after Sun moved to Phoenix.
- Shortly before their planned wedding, the parties decided to marry before the start of spring training.
- On February 5, 1988, the day before the marriage ceremony, they executed a written premarital agreement in Phoenix stating each party waived any interest in the other’s earnings and acquisitions during marriage.
- The agreement was drafted by Barry’s attorney, who discussed its terms with Sun about two weeks before signing and advised her that consulting an attorney would be in her best interest.
- On the signing day, the attorney reviewed the agreement with Sun paragraph by paragraph; Sun was accompanied by a friend, conferred with her, requested revisions that were made, and expressly declined independent counsel.
- In later dissolution proceedings, Sun sought to invalidate the agreement, asserting it was not voluntary and was unconscionable, emphasizing her lack of counsel, limited English and U.S. legal familiarity, and Barry’s increased earnings during marriage.

## Issues

1. Under Family Code § 1615 (UPAA), whether a premarital agreement must be evaluated under a heightened standard or presumption of involuntariness when the challenging party lacked independent counsel.
2. Whether substantial evidence supported enforcement of the parties’ premarital agreement as voluntarily executed and not unenforceable for unconscionability under § 1615.

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and reinstated the trial court’s judgment enforcing the premarital agreement.
- The Court rejected a rule of “strict scrutiny” or a presumption of involuntariness based solely on the absence of independent counsel.
- The Court held voluntariness under § 1615 is determined from the totality of circumstances, with independent counsel being one relevant factor.
- The Court concluded substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Sun executed the agreement voluntarily, including advance discussion, repeated advice to seek counsel, detailed explanation of terms, requested revisions, and findings that she understood the rights being waived.
- The Court upheld the trial court’s determination that the agreement was not shown unenforceable for unconscionability under the statutory framework, which focuses primarily on conditions at execution rather than later changes in earnings.

## Legal Principles

- Under Family Code § 1615, voluntariness of a premarital agreement is assessed under a totality-of-the-circumstances test; no heightened judicial standard applies beyond the statute.
- Lack of independent counsel does not, by itself, invalidate a premarital agreement; it is one factor among others bearing on voluntariness.
- Relevant voluntariness considerations may include timing relative to the wedding and any surprise, opportunity to consult counsel, bargaining power disparities, disclosure of assets, and understanding of the rights being waived and the agreement’s intent.
- Unconscionability under the UPAA is evaluated primarily as of the time the agreement was executed, and enforceability depends on the statutory conditions governing disclosure and knowledge.
- Courts must apply the UPAA’s statutory balance between contractual freedom and protective safeguards and may not impose additional categorical requirements not found in the statute.

## Conclusion

The California Supreme Court enforced the premarital agreement, holding that the absence of independent counsel does not create a presumption of involuntariness and that voluntariness and unconscionability under the UPAA require a contextual, fact-based analysis supported here by substantial evidence.


In re Marriage of Bonds, 24 Cal. 4th 1 (Cal. 2000)