## Facts

- Larry Allen Farr (husband) and Joy Lynn Farr (wife) were married for about thirty years, and that marriage ended in dissolution in 1999.
- About four years later, in 2003, husband told wife he was terminally ill and would die within a few years.
- Wife agreed to remarry husband because she did not want him to die alone.
- The parties remarried in 2004.
- In 2007, husband filed a petition to dissolve the second marriage.
- Wife cross-petitioned for a declaration that the second marriage was invalid under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-111(1)(d), alleging husband fraudulently induced her consent by misrepresenting that he had a terminal illness.
- At the hearing, the parties presented conflicting evidence about the seriousness of husband’s condition; husband also argued his statements were innocent misrepresentations rather than fraud.
- The district court credited wife’s testimony, dismissed the dissolution petition, and declared the second marriage invalid.
- The court later entered permanent orders on property division, maintenance, and attorney fees pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, and it denied husband’s request for attorney fees.
- Husband appealed the invalidity judgment and the denial of attorney fees; wife moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely.

## Issues

1. Whether the notice of appeal was timely when filed within forty-five days after entry of permanent orders, rather than within forty-five days after the order declaring the marriage invalid.
2. Whether a fraud-based request to declare a marriage invalid under § 14-10-111(1)(d) must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or instead by a preponderance of the evidence.
3. Whether the evidence supported the district court’s finding that husband’s statements about being terminally ill constituted fraud going to the essentials of the marriage and justified invalidating the marriage.
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying husband’s request for attorney fees.

## Decision

- The court of appeals denied wife’s motion to dismiss and held the appeal was timely because the case was not final until entry of permanent orders resolving the remaining issues.
- The court held that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies to a fraud-based invalidity claim under § 14-10-111(1)(d).
- The court affirmed the judgment declaring the second marriage invalid, concluding the district court’s findings on misrepresentation, reliance, and the effect on the essentials of the marriage were supported by the record and depended on credibility determinations the trial court was entitled to make.
- The court affirmed the order denying husband’s request for attorney fees.

## Legal Principles

- A notice of appeal must be filed within forty-five days of the final judgment; timely filing is a jurisdictional requirement. C.A.R. 4(a).
- Generally, an appeal lies only from a final judgment that resolves the entire case; an earlier order is appealable before final judgment only if certified under C.R.C.P. 54(b).
- When a marriage is declared invalid under § 14-10-111(1), the permanent-order provisions applicable in dissolution proceedings (including property division, maintenance, and fees) apply as if the marriage had been dissolved; as a result, an invalidity order may not be final for appellate purposes until permanent orders enter.
- Absent a statutory requirement for a heightened evidentiary standard, a fraud-based invalidity claim under § 14-10-111(1)(d) is proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
- Whether a misrepresentation is fraudulent and whether it goes to the essentials of the marriage are fact questions committed to the trial court; appellate review is deferential to supported findings and credibility assessments.
- Domestic-relations attorney-fee rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

## Conclusion

The Colorado Court of Appeals held that husband’s appeal was timely because finality occurred when the stipulated permanent orders were entered, not when the marriage was first declared invalid, and it affirmed the district court’s determination that wife proved fraud by a preponderance of the evidence under § 14-10-111(1)(d) and its denial of husband’s request for attorney fees.


In re Marriage of Farr, 228 P.3d 267 (2010)