## Facts

- Before marriage, the husband owned a Santa Barbara residence and a vacant lot as separate property.
- In 1976, he conveyed both parcels to himself and his wife as joint tenants.
- The dissolution judgment (1992) characterized both parcels as community property, finding no oral or written agreement preserving any separate-property interest beyond the deeds.
- After judgment, the husband moved for a new trial, citing intervening authority and former Civil Code sections creating a reimbursement right for separate-property contributions unless waived in writing.
- The trial court granted a new trial, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.
- The wife sought review, arguing that applying the reimbursement statutes to the 1976 conveyances would be unconstitutional.

## Issues

1. Whether, in a dissolution action filed after January 1, 1984, the Legislature may require reimbursement for separate-property contributions made before that date when, under then-existing law, the contributions were treated as a gift and the other spouse’s community interest had vested.
2. Whether applying the reimbursement statute to pre-1984 transactions impermissibly impairs vested property rights in violation of state constitutional due process.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of California reversed.
- The court held that applying the reimbursement statute to the husband’s 1976 separate-property contributions would unconstitutionally deprive the wife of a vested property right without due process.
- The court reinstated the dissolution judgment treating the parcels as community property without reimbursement to the husband.
- The court distinguished authority upholding retroactive application of changes characterized as evidentiary rules, concluding the reimbursement statute, as applied here, altered substantive ownership rights.

## Legal Principles

- A spouse’s property rights can vest under the marital property law in effect at the time of a transaction, and later legislation cannot retroactively diminish those vested rights without violating due process.
- When, under pre-1984 law, a separate-property contribution to jointly titled property was treated as a gift absent an agreement for reimbursement, the noncontributing spouse’s resulting interest is a vested property right.
- A statutory reimbursement scheme that reallocates ownership interests by imposing reimbursement for pre-enactment contributions operates as a substantive change, not a mere procedural or evidentiary adjustment.
- The Legislature cannot avoid constitutional limits on retroactive impairment of vested property rights by directing that a statute apply to later-filed dissolution actions “regardless” of the acquisition date.
- A theoretical opportunity, after enactment, for a spouse to obtain a written waiver does not supply sufficient justification to retroactively reduce vested interests created under prior law.

## Conclusion

The court held that due process prohibits applying California’s reimbursement statute to require reimbursement for separate-property contributions made before the statute’s effective date when those contributions, under then-existing law, had already vested the other spouse’s community property interest.


In re Marriage of Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th 1211 (Cal. 1995)