## Facts

- Herschel Ralph Jones entered military service in 1957.
- Herschel married Sumiko Jones in 1964.
- In 1969, while on active duty in Vietnam, Herschel lost a leg in combat and was retired for disability with monthly disability pay.
- Herschel’s entitlement arose under federal military disability provisions and was based on disability rather than a vested longevity-based retirement right.
- In 1972, Sumiko filed for dissolution and sought division of Herschel’s asserted “right to lifetime disability payments” as community property.
- The superior court ruled that disability payments received after dissolution were Herschel’s separate property.

## Issues

1. Whether a married servicemember’s right to receive military disability pay (as distinct from vested longevity retirement pay) is community property subject to division upon dissolution.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment.
- The court held that a servicemember’s right to military disability pay is not a community asset subject to division upon dissolution.
- Post-dissolution disability payments were the disabled spouse’s separate property.

## Legal Principles

- Community property includes vested retirement benefits to the extent they constitute deferred compensation for services performed during marriage.
- Military disability pay is not treated as deferred compensation; it compensates for personal injury-related harms and impaired future earning capacity.
- Because the ongoing burdens of disability and diminished post-service earning capacity fall on the disabled spouse after dissolution, compensation for those losses remains that spouse’s separate property after dissolution.
- The classification turns on the nature of the entitlement: disability-based benefits are treated differently from longevity-based retirement benefits.

## Conclusion

The court distinguished disability pay from vested retirement pay and held that military disability benefits payable after dissolution are separate property because they compensate the disabled spouse for personal injury and post-dissolution loss of earning capacity, rather than for marital-period services.


In re Marriage of Jones, 531 P.2d 420 (Cal. 1975)