## Facts

- The State filed a juvenile petition alleging M.E. committed theft and criminal mischief at age 15.
- M.E. was married at the time of the alleged offenses.
- At the adjudication hearing, M.E. objected that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction because her marriage meant she should be prosecuted in criminal court.
- The juvenile court overruled the objection, accepted M.E.’s pleas of true, adjudicated her delinquent, and placed her on six months’ probation.
- M.E. appealed solely on the jurisdictional question.

## Issues

1. Whether a Texas juvenile court lacks jurisdiction over a married person under 17 because marriage removes the minor from the statutory definition of “child” for juvenile proceedings.

## Decision

- The court of appeals affirmed.
- It held that marital status does not remove a person under 17 from the Juvenile Justice Code’s age-based definition of “child.”
- Because M.E. was 15 at the time of the conduct, the juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction over the delinquency proceeding.

## Legal Principles

- Texas juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over delinquency proceedings involving a person who was a “child” at the time of the conduct. (Tex. Fam. Code § 51.04(a))
- Under the Juvenile Justice Code, “child” is defined by age (generally, at least 10 and under 17) and does not turn on marital status. (Tex. Fam. Code § 51.02(2))
- Civil emancipation by marriage, including adult-like contractual capacity, does not alter juvenile-court jurisdiction absent an express statutory exception. (Tex. Fam. Code § 1.104)
- A minor’s prosecution in criminal court occurs only through statutory mechanisms such as discretionary transfer/waiver of juvenile jurisdiction, not automatically by marriage. (Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02)

## Conclusion

The court held that a married minor who is under 17 at the time of alleged delinquent conduct remains a “child” under the Texas Juvenile Justice Code, so the juvenile court retains jurisdiction and the delinquency adjudication and probation order were affirmed.


In re M.E., 982 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.)