## Facts

- Rhoda Lavinia Goodell studied law in Janesville, Wisconsin, and was admitted to practice in a Wisconsin circuit court in 1874.
- Wisconsin law required a separate order of the Wisconsin Supreme Court for admission to practice before that court, notwithstanding circuit-court admission.
- Goodell was retained to represent a client in a probate matter that reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court on appeal, prompting a motion for her admission to that court’s bar.
- The motion was presented through attorney I. C. Sloan and argued on the legal question whether a woman could be admitted as an attorney before the court under existing law.
- The admission statute used masculine phrasing (including that an applicant “he shall first be licensed by its order”), while a separate construction statute generally provided that masculine terms could include females unless a contrary intent plainly appeared.

## Issues

1. Whether Wisconsin statutes then in force authorized or required the Wisconsin Supreme Court to admit a woman to practice as an attorney and counselor at law before it.
2. Whether the general statutory rule construing masculine terms to include females applied to the Supreme Court bar-admission statute.
3. Whether common-law understandings about who may practice law informed the meaning of the admission statute and the court’s authority.

## Decision

- The Wisconsin Supreme Court unanimously denied the motion to admit Goodell to its bar.
- The court held there was no statutory authority to admit women to the bar of any court in the state under the governing admission scheme.
- The court concluded the masculine language in the admission statute was intended to be gender-specific and not expanded by the general construction statute.
- The court relied on common-law tradition excluding women from advocacy as confirming that the legislature did not contemplate female admission.
- The court stated that any change permitting women’s admission was for the legislature rather than the judiciary.

## Legal Principles

- Admission to practice before the state supreme court is not a natural right; it depends on statutory authorization and the court’s licensing order.
- Admission to a circuit court does not itself create a right to admission before the supreme court when the statute requires separate licensing by that court.
- A general statutory canon that masculine terms include females does not apply where the broader statutory context and accepted legal tradition indicate a contrary intent.
- Common-law understandings about eligibility to practice law may be used to interpret bar-admission statutes and to assess whether the legislature intended to depart from historical exclusions.
- Where the legislature has not clearly authorized expansion of bar eligibility, the court will not effect that change through interpretation in the admissions context.

## Conclusion

The court denied Goodell’s admission because it read the bar-admission statute, in light of common-law tradition, as authorizing admission of men only and found no legislative authorization to admit women, leaving any change in eligibility to the legislature.


In re Motion to Admit Miss Lavinia Goodell to the Bar of This Court, 39 Wis. 232 (Wis. 1875)