## Facts

- Mark Meltzer was arrested in New Jersey on narcotics charges in 1978, posted bail, and was later indicted for marijuana offenses.
- Joseph L. Nackson, a criminal defense attorney, entered an appearance for Meltzer in January 1979 and obtained adjournments of Meltzer’s arraignment.
- In September 1979, Nackson told the prosecutor Meltzer was jailed in Iowa and could not appear; Meltzer’s bail was revoked and a bench warrant issued.
- Meltzer later became a fugitive; mail to known addresses was returned undelivered.
- Nackson and Meltzer never met in person, but spoke by telephone; Nackson attempted to negotiate a plea arrangement.
- Meltzer, aware he was a fugitive, told Nackson he would return to New Jersey only if a plea agreement could be reached.
- In 1987, Nackson informed the prosecutor that Meltzer had reformed and was somewhere in the Chicago area; the prosecutor demanded Meltzer’s exact location, and Nackson refused based on attorney-client privilege.
- A grand jury subpoena required Nackson to testify during an investigation of Meltzer’s failure to appear.
- The trial court denied a motion to quash and later ruled Nackson’s legal advice was privileged but ordered him to disclose Meltzer’s address and contact information; Nackson refused and was held in contempt.
- The Appellate Division reversed, requiring consideration of less intrusive ways to obtain the information before piercing privilege.
- While the appeal was pending, Meltzer was arrested elsewhere, but the court decided the privilege issue due to its recurring importance.

## Issues

1. Whether an attorney may invoke attorney-client privilege to refuse to disclose to a grand jury a fugitive client’s current whereabouts or contact information obtained during representation.
2. Whether communications related to surrender strategy or plea negotiations remain privileged when the client is a fugitive.
3. Whether a crime-fraud or “ongoing crime/obstruction” theory permits compelling disclosure of the client’s location in these circumstances.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the Appellate Division and vacated the basis for the contempt citation.
- It held that, on these facts, Nackson properly declined to disclose Meltzer’s whereabouts because the information was protected by attorney-client privilege.
- It rejected a broad exception that would require disclosure merely because the client was a fugitive.
- It concluded the crime-fraud (or future-crime) exception did not apply absent evidence the attorney counseled continued flight or otherwise participated in criminal conduct.
- It approved requiring the State to pursue alternative investigative means before seeking to compel information intertwined with privileged communications.

## Legal Principles

- Attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice; it can extend beyond verbal legal advice when disclosure would effectively reveal the substance of protected communications.
- Client identity or location is not automatically privileged, but may be privileged when “inextricably intertwined” with confidential communications or when disclosure would reveal the client’s motive, strategy, or other protected confidences.
- The crime-fraud (or future-crime) exception is narrowly applied; prior wrongdoing or fugitive status alone does not remove privilege absent attorney participation in ongoing criminal conduct or use of legal services to further a future crime.
- Grand jury power to compel evidence yields to valid claims of privilege; prosecutors should ordinarily seek the same information through non-privileged sources before intruding into the attorney-client relationship.
- Lawyers have an enforceable professional duty to maintain client confidences, and courts should not compel disclosure without a clearly applicable exception or overriding legal authority.

## Conclusion

The court held that an attorney could not be compelled to disclose a fugitive client’s whereabouts to a grand jury when the information was obtained through representation and disclosure would reveal confidential communications about surrender and plea strategy, and no crime-fraud or similar exception applied.


In re Nackson, 114 N.J. 527, 555 A.2d 1101 (N.J. 1989)