## Facts

- Sandra Sandoval adopted two children, N.I.V.S. (2002) and M.C.V.S. (2004), as newborns while cohabiting with Dino Villarreal.
- Villarreal and Sandoval lived together with the children for about seven years, during which Villarreal acted in a parental role and was known to the children as the father.
- The couple separated in January 2011; Villarreal moved out but continued to see and care for the children for a period.
- In November 2013, Sandoval stopped allowing Villarreal to see the children.
- Villarreal obtained a court-ordered name change and a separate court order recognizing his male gender identity.
- Villarreal filed (1) a suit to adjudicate parentage and (2) a suit affecting the parent-child relationship seeking joint managing conservatorship and equal possession, and he executed a voluntary statement of paternity.
- Sandoval moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, asserting Villarreal lacked standing under the Texas Family Code.

## Issues

1. Whether a transgender man with a court order recognizing his male gender identity qualifies as a “man” for standing under Tex. Fam. Code §§ 160.602(a)(3) and 102.003(a)(8).
2. Whether the trial court erred by dismissing the parentage and conservatorship-related claims for lack of standing based on the conclusion that Villarreal was not a “man.”

## Decision

- The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s jurisdictional dismissal in part and remanded.
- The court held Villarreal qualified as a “man” for purposes of Tex. Fam. Code §§ 160.602(a)(3) and 102.003(a)(8) because his male gender identity had been recognized by court order.
- The court concluded the trial court incorrectly denied standing solely on the basis that Villarreal was not a “man.”
- The court did not decide the merits of Villarreal’s claimed parental rights; it addressed only standing and jurisdiction.

## Legal Principles

- Standing in Texas parentage and SAPCR proceedings is governed by statutory categories; a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction when the claimant does not fit a statutory standing provision.
- For statutes using gendered terms such as “man,” a valid court order recognizing an individual’s male gender identity may establish that the individual is a “man” for purposes of Texas Family Code standing provisions.
- Tex. Fam. Code § 160.602(a)(3) permits a proceeding to adjudicate parentage by “a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated.”
- Tex. Fam. Code § 102.003(a)(8) permits an original SAPCR by “a man alleging himself to be the father of a child.”
- A trial court may not deny standing under these provisions solely because the claimant was assigned female at birth when the claimant has a court order recognizing male gender identity and alleges fatherhood.

## Conclusion

The court held that a transgender man with a court order recognizing his male gender identity is a “man” for purposes of Texas Family Code standing provisions allowing a man to seek adjudication of paternity and to file a SAPCR alleging fatherhood, and it reversed the jurisdictional dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.


In re N.I.V.S. & M.C.V.S., No. 04-14-00751-CV, 2015 WL 1120913 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 11, 2015)