## Facts

- Orva M. O’Neil owned a residence in Garden City, New York.
- On April 7, 1955, Orva wrote a letter to her daughter, Tess, stating in substance that Tess’s son John and his family were “welcome to live as long as they wish” in the Garden City house.
- The letter was a personal communication and was not executed as a deed, and it was not incorporated into (or executed with the formalities required for) a will.
- After Orva’s death, the estate proceeded with administration and the Garden City house was sold.
- John asserted that the letter gave him and his family a life estate (or an equivalent enforceable interest) that would prevent the estate from selling the property free of his claim.
- The Surrogate’s Court, Nassau County, rejected John’s claim, determining that the letter did not grant him a life estate.
- John appealed from the Surrogate’s decree to the Appellate Division, Second Department.

## Issues

1. Whether a decedent’s informal letter stating that a grandson and his family are “welcome to live as long as they wish” in the decedent’s house creates a life estate or other enforceable interest in the real property against the estate.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the Surrogate’s Court decree.
- The court agreed that the letter did not create a life estate in favor of John (and did not give him an enforceable property interest that would defeat the estate’s sale).

## Legal Principles

- A life estate is an estate in land and generally must be created by clear words of grant or devise showing an intent to transfer a present interest for life (or for a defined lifetime), rather than a statement of permission or hospitality.
- Courts distinguish between an estate in land (such as a life estate) and a personal right to live in or occupy premises; permissive “you may live there” language may amount to no more than a personal privilege, not a property estate.
- Writings that function as transfers of interests in real property ordinarily must satisfy the governing formal requirements (for example, deed requirements for inter vivos conveyances or will-execution requirements for testamentary dispositions).
- An informal letter that lacks operative grant language and does not satisfy conveyancing or testamentary formalities is generally insufficient to create an enforceable life estate binding on an estate and those taking title through estate administration.
- When the asserted interest is not a recognized estate in land, the property remains an estate asset subject to administration, including sale, in accordance with the fiduciary’s authority and the probate court’s supervision.

## Conclusion

In *In re O’Neil’s Will*, the Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s determination that Orva O’Neil’s 1955 letter to her daughter—stating that her grandson John and his family were “welcome to live as long as they wish” in the Garden City house—did not create a life estate or other enforceable property interest. As a result, John had no legally enforceable interest that prevented the estate from treating the house as an estate asset and selling it during administration.


In re O'Neil's Will, 8 A.D.2d 631 (1959)