## Facts

- Sherry S. (mother) and Dean S. (husband) were married and had an open, non-monogamous relationship; they participated in a swingers group.
- Sherry met Frederick S. (alleged father) through the group, and Sherry and Frederick had sexual relations.
- Sherry became pregnant and told Dean that the child might not be his, though Dean was legally presumed to be the father because he was married to Sherry when the child was born.
- C.S. was born in July 2002; Dean was present at the birth and was listed as the father on the birth certificate.
- About one month after C.S.’s birth, DNA testing excluded Dean as the biological father.
- Sherry and Dean decided to end their marriage.
- Frederick was a married attorney, and his wife did not know about his infidelity. After Sherry attempted to contact him, Frederick removed his online presence, making him difficult to reach.
- In late 2003, Sherry reconnected with Frederick when C.S. needed surgery and she sought family medical information.
- In January 2004, DNA testing confirmed Frederick was C.S.’s biological father.
- Frederick began paying Sherry $500 per month in child support after the paternity confirmation.
- In August 2004—more than two years after C.S.’s birth—Dean filed a petition to disestablish his presumed paternity and to adjudicate Frederick as C.S.’s legal father; Sherry joined the petition.
- Frederick moved to dismiss, arguing the petition was barred by the statute of limitations in Washington’s Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). The trial court dismissed the action as time-barred, and Sherry and Dean appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the UPA’s statute of limitations for an action to disestablish a presumed father’s paternity and establish another man’s paternity can be extended by the discovery rule.
2. Whether Frederick’s conduct (including making himself difficult to locate and allegedly misleading Sherry) equitably estopped him from asserting the statute of limitations.
3. Whether enforcing the limitations period violated the child’s due process or equal protection rights when the child was not a party to the case.
4. Whether the parents could bypass the UPA limitations period by pleading a common-law parentage action or a fraud claim.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal.
- The court held the discovery rule did not apply to extend the UPA limitations period for this type of parentage action.
- The court held equitable estoppel did not toll the limitations period on these facts.
- The court rejected the constitutional challenges based on the child’s due process and equal protection rights, noting the child was not a party and therefore was not bound by the litigation.
- The court held the asserted common-law parentage and fraud theories provided no valid basis to avoid the UPA’s statutory scheme and time limits.

## Legal Principles

- Parentage determinations in Washington are governed by the UPA, including its specific time limits for actions challenging the paternity of a presumed father.
- Absent legislative direction, courts will not add a common-law discovery rule to extend a statutory limitations period in a parentage action governed by the UPA.
- Equitable estoppel is not applied simply because the alleged father was difficult to locate; where petitioners have early knowledge supporting a challenge, they must still file within the statutory period.
- A child’s constitutional objections to a limitations bar are weakened where the child is not joined as a party and thus is not bound by the outcome of the parents’ action.
- Parties may not use alternative labels—such as “common-law parentage” or “fraud”—to obtain parentage relief that conflicts with, or would circumvent, the UPA’s procedural limits.

## Conclusion

The Washington Court of Appeals held that Sherry and Dean’s petition to disestablish Dean’s presumed paternity and establish Frederick’s paternity was barred by the UPA statute of limitations, and neither the discovery rule nor equitable estoppel extended the filing deadline; the court also rejected constitutional and alternative common-law or fraud theories offered to avoid the statutory time bar.


In re Parentage of C.S., 139 P.3d 366 (2006)