## Facts

- Charles F. Passmore created an inter vivos revocable trust in 1970, administered by a bank trustee, and divided into Trust A and Trust B.
- Charles’s wife, Laura O. Passmore, held a life income interest in both Trust A and Trust B.
- Laura received a testamentary power of appointment over the remainder of Trust A.
- The trust instrument stated the power could be exercised in Laura’s will by “specific reference to Trust A,” while also describing the power as “without restriction or qualification of any kind.”
- In her will, Laura purported to exercise any power of appointment she held “under any will or trust agreement executed by my husband, Charles F. Passmore,” appointing the property into a new trust largely for her sisters, with charitable remainder beneficiaries (including a church).
- After Laura’s death, the trustee concluded the power was not effectively exercised because the will did not expressly say “Trust A,” and it filed an account distributing Trust A as if the power had lapsed.
- Laura’s estate and a charitable beneficiary objected, arguing Laura’s will effectively exercised the power.

## Issues

1. Whether a will that refers to exercising a power of appointment granted under the donor spouse’s will or trust agreements satisfies a trust condition requiring exercise by “specific reference to Trust A.”
2. Whether substantial compliance with a “specific reference” clause is sufficient when the donee’s intent to exercise the particular power is clear.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the orphans’ court.
- The court held Laura effectively exercised the testamentary power of appointment over Trust A.
- The trustee was required to account for and distribute Trust A in accordance with Laura’s appointed plan set out in her will.

## Legal Principles

- A donor-imposed requirement that a power of appointment be exercised by “specific reference” is primarily intended to prevent inadvertent exercise through general or boilerplate will provisions.
- A donee’s will may satisfy a “specific reference” condition without repeating the trust’s exact label if the will clearly identifies the donor and the donor’s instrument(s) as the source of the power and shows a deliberate intent to exercise that power.
- Courts may reject strictly literal enforcement of “specific reference” wording where the will’s language achieves the clause’s protective purpose and effectuates the donor’s and donee’s demonstrated intent.

## Conclusion

The court enforced Laura Passmore’s appointment of Trust A despite her failure to use the exact words “Trust A,” concluding her will’s targeted reference to powers granted by her husband’s will or trust agreements sufficiently met the trust’s specific-reference condition and validly directed Trust A’s remainder disposition.


In re Passmore, 416 A.2d 991 (Pa. 1980)