## Facts

- A group of major oil companies produced and refined crude oil into gasoline and sold gasoline to independent dealers through distributors.
- The companies used “posted” wholesale prices along with dealer discounts; when wholesale gasoline prices changed, the change often occurred through adjustments to dealer discounts rather than changes to posted prices.
- Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington sued the oil companies in federal district court, alleging a § 1 Sherman Act conspiracy to raise or stabilize gasoline prices.
- The states claimed the companies coordinated dealer-discount withdrawals and price increases, shared pricing information, and used communications that helped rivals match price moves.
- To support the conspiracy claim, the states relied mainly on circumstantial evidence, including:
  - pricing-pattern evidence showing gasoline prices rising and falling over time in a way the states said was synchronized,
  - press releases announcing intended discount withdrawals and price increases,
  - public postings of prices and dealer discounts, and
  - evidence of contacts among the companies.
- The states argued that the press releases and public postings were intended to communicate pricing intentions to competitors so competitors could follow the same pricing actions.
- The oil companies denied any unlawful agreement and argued the record showed lawful, independent pricing in a cyclical market, including that price increases were often followed by price decreases.
- The oil companies also contended that their press releases and postings were lawful: announcements could be aimed at customers and the market, and public postings could reflect transparency for customers and dealers.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the oil companies on the states’ § 1 claims, concluding the states’ proof did not create a triable issue of agreement.
- The states appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether, on summary judgment, the states presented sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer a § 1 agreement to fix or stabilize gasoline prices, rather than lawful independent or interdependent conduct.
2. Whether evidence of press releases and public postings about dealer discounts and price changes, together with pricing patterns and other contacts, could serve as “plus factors” supporting an inference of concerted action.
3. Whether the district court erred by treating the states’ evidence as consistent only with lawful conduct and therefore insufficient as a matter of law.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the district court’s summary judgment in significant part and remanded for further proceedings on the core § 1 conspiracy theory.
- The court held that the states’ evidence—pricing patterns combined with evidence of communications and information sharing about discounts and price changes—could permit a reasonable jury to find an agreement.
- The court explained that public announcements and postings are not automatically irrelevant to conspiracy analysis; depending on how they function in the market and their timing, they may support an inference of coordination.
- The court rejected resolving competing interpretations of the circumstantial record at summary judgment where a jury could reasonably draw an inference of agreement from the evidence taken as a whole.

## Legal Principles

- A Sherman Act § 1 plaintiff may prove agreement through circumstantial evidence, but must show more than mere parallel pricing.
- At summary judgment, the question is whether the totality of admissible evidence permits a reasonable inference of concerted action, not whether the court finds defendants’ independent-action explanations more convincing.
- Parallel conduct may support a § 1 inference when combined with additional facts (often called “plus factors”), such as a pattern of information exchanges or communications that make coordination more likely.
- Information sharing or communications about pricing may be lawful in some settings, but can be probative of agreement when they appear designed to communicate future pricing moves and facilitate matching behavior.

## Conclusion

Because the states presented circumstantial evidence that went beyond parallel pricing—including coordinated discount-withdrawal signaling through press releases and public price/discount postings, along with other contact evidence—the court held a reasonable jury could infer a price-fixing agreement under Sherman Act § 1, making summary judgment inappropriate on the main conspiracy claims and requiring a remand for further proceedings.


In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 906 F.2d 432 (1988)