## Facts

- A natural father and mother, never married, had a long and violent relationship and later separated.
- The mother remarried; the parties later entered a stipulated custody agreement giving the mother custody and the father visitation.
- The father’s visitation became problematic, including an incident in which he used his vehicle to chase the stepfather’s car while two children were inside.
- The father was convicted of misdemeanor endangerment based on the chase incident.
- The children’s court-appointed attorney, joined by the mother, petitioned to terminate the father’s parental rights, alleging violent behavior and an “explosive personality” harmful to the children.
- After a three-day hearing, the juvenile court found statutory grounds for severance and that termination was in the children’s best interests, and terminated the father’s parental rights.
- The father appealed, challenging (among other points) the children’s standing to file the severance petition through counsel.

## Issues

1. Whether minor children, acting through court-appointed counsel (and joined by the mother), have statutory standing to file a petition to terminate a parent’s rights.
2. Whether statutory references to “the child” and “the petitioner” as separate terms bar a child from being the petitioner.
3. Whether permitting a child to initiate a severance petition is inconsistent with minors’ general legal incapacity and violates statutory or constitutional limits.
4. Whether attorney’s fees and costs were properly handled following affirmance of the severance order.

## Decision

- The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s order terminating the father’s parental rights.
- The court held that a minor child may be a severance petitioner through a representative such as court-appointed counsel.
- The court rejected the argument that the statute’s use of “child” and “petitioner” necessarily requires two different entities.
- The court rejected the argument that minors’ inability to perform other legal acts (e.g., driving or marrying) prevents them from seeking severance through counsel.
- In a supplemental opinion, the court addressed post-decision attorney-fee and cost issues without changing the affirmance of termination.

## Legal Principles

- Under Arizona severance statutes allowing petitions by any person or agency with a legitimate interest in a child’s welfare, a child has standing, through counsel or another representative, to petition to terminate parental rights.
- Statutory references to “the child” and “the petitioner” do not, without clearer legislative direction, prohibit the child from also being the petitioner.
- Minors’ lack of capacity to personally undertake certain legal acts does not negate their legally protectable interest in proceedings determining their safety, stability, and welfare; that interest may be asserted on their behalf by counsel.
- When severance is supported by statutory grounds and the child’s best interests, an order terminating parental rights will be upheld on appeal; fee and cost issues may be resolved separately without disturbing the merits disposition.

## Conclusion

The Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights, holding that minor children—acting through court-appointed counsel—may file severance petitions under broad statutory standing language, and it later issued a supplemental ruling addressing attorney’s fees without altering the merits outcome.


In re Pima Cnty. Juv. Severance Action No. S-113432, 872 P.2d 1240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)