## Facts

- Madlyn Ridley-Fisher and her son, Patrick Ridley, were the sole beneficiaries of the Virginia P. Ridley Trust.
- Ridley-Fisher’s husband, Harold Fisher, was a creditor of the trust.
- Ridley-Fisher, Fisher, and Ridley jointly retained attorney Anthony Rachal III to (1) remove trustee Brenda Hopkins, (2) install a new trustee, (3) compel payment to Fisher as a creditor, and (4) compel distributions of trust assets to the beneficiaries.
- Rachal filed a complaint on behalf of all three clients but did not adequately explain the possible conflicts among beneficiaries and a creditor, and he did not obtain informed conflict consent before undertaking the joint representation.
- A consent order permitted Hopkins to resign, appointed Brian Hopson as successor trustee, and barred Hopson from making trust distributions without court approval while Hopkins’s counterclaims remained unresolved.
- Fisher, with Ridley-Fisher’s consent, asked Hopson to reimburse Fisher for expenses Fisher claimed the trust owed; Hopson paid Fisher $9,613.34.
- Ridley and Rachal later objected to the payment and demanded that Fisher return the funds to the trust.
- The Fishers refused and expressly instructed Rachal not to seek a court order requiring repayment.
- Despite those instructions, and while still representing the Fishers, Rachal filed a praecipe asking the court to order Fisher to return the $9,613.34.
- The court denied the request, stating that a praecipe was not a proper vehicle for seeking that kind of relief; the Fishers filed a pro se opposition in response to Rachal’s filing.
- Disciplinary Counsel charged Rachal with professional misconduct based on conflicts in the concurrent representation and the filing directed against current clients.

## Issues

1. Whether substantial evidence supported findings that Rachal violated Rule 1.7(b)(1), (2), and (3) by representing multiple clients with conflicting interests without informed consent and by taking action adverse to current clients in the same matter.
2. Whether substantial evidence supported a finding that Rachal violated Rule 1.3(b)(2) by intentionally prejudicing or damaging clients during the professional relationship, including by filing the praecipe contrary to the Fishers’ express instructions.
3. Whether Rachal’s procedural objections to the disciplinary proceedings (including claims that witness testimony was improperly “suppressed”) warranted rejecting the Board’s findings.
4. What sanction was appropriate given the violations, mitigating circumstances, and comparable disciplinary cases.

## Decision

- The D.C. Court of Appeals accepted the Board on Professional Responsibility’s findings, concluding that substantial evidence supported misconduct findings for:
  - Rule 1.7(b)(1), (2), and (3) (conflict of interest in concurrent representation without effective conflict consent and with adverse action against current clients), and
  - Rule 1.3(b)(2) (intentional prejudice or damage to a client during the professional relationship).
- The court rejected Rachal’s procedural challenges, finding they were not supported by the record.
- The court determined the Board’s recommended three-month suspension was too severe on this record.
- The court imposed a 30-day suspension, stayed in favor of one year of probation, conditioned on completion of six hours of CLE approved by Disciplinary Counsel, including instruction related to representing multiple clients in civil matters.

## Legal Principles

- A lawyer may not represent multiple clients in the same matter when their interests conflict, unless the lawyer provides full disclosure, obtains each client’s informed consent, and reasonably believes competent and diligent representation of each client remains possible.
- When a disagreement develops among jointly represented clients, a lawyer cannot keep representing all clients while advocating against one or more of them in the same matter without valid conflict consent; withdrawal may be required.
- Acting contrary to a client’s express direction and seeking court relief that would harm that client can constitute “intentional prejudice or damage” under Rule 1.3(b)(2), even if the lawyer believes the step benefits another client.
- In attorney discipline, the court generally accepts the Board’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence and will reject procedural complaints that the record does not substantiate.
- Sanctions are set to protect the public and the courts and to deter similar misconduct, with consideration of mitigation such as lack of prior discipline and other beneficial aspects of the lawyer’s work.

## Conclusion

In *In re Rachal*, the D.C. Court of Appeals disciplined an attorney who jointly represented trust beneficiaries and a trust creditor without effective conflict consent and then sought court action against two current clients over a trust payment despite their express instructions not to do so; the court sustained violations of Rules 1.7(b) and 1.3(b)(2), rejected procedural objections, and imposed a 30-day suspension stayed for one year of probation with a CLE requirement.


In re Rachal, 251 A.3d 1038 (2021)