## Facts

- A delinquency petition was filed in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Division for Juvenile Causes, alleging Randolph T. (a juvenile) committed delinquent acts.
- The alleged acts arose from a Baltimore City incident when Randolph was just under seventeen and included: possessing an unregistered short-barreled shotgun, carrying a handgun, discharging a firearm within city limits, and openly carrying a sawed-off shotgun.
- The State’s Attorney moved to waive juvenile jurisdiction under Md. Code (Courts & Judicial Proceedings) § 3-817 so Randolph could be proceeded against under regular criminal procedure.
- A waiver hearing was held on June 9, 1980.
- At the time of the waiver hearing, Randolph was incarcerated and awaiting trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore on an unrelated murder charge; the juvenile judge considered that circumstance along with the nature of the events and public safety.
- The juvenile court waived its exclusive jurisdiction and ordered Randolph held for action under the appropriate criminal procedure.
- In doing so, the juvenile judge stated he was applying the statutory standard of proof—preponderance of the evidence—and rejected the argument that due process required a higher burden under civil-commitment precedent.
- Randolph appealed; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported decision.
- The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to decide the constitutional question concerning the burden of proof in waiver proceedings.

## Issues

1. Whether due process permits Maryland’s waiver statute, § 3-817(c), to require proof by a preponderance of the evidence for a juvenile-court waiver of jurisdiction.
2. Whether due process instead requires a higher standard of proof (such as clear and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt) before transferring a juvenile to adult criminal court.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and upheld the waiver order.
- The court held that § 3-817(c)’s preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for waiving juvenile jurisdiction is constitutional.
- The court rejected the argument that civil-commitment cases (including *Addington v. Texas*) require a higher burden of proof for waiver determinations.

## Legal Principles

- Waiver of juvenile jurisdiction is not an adjudication of guilt; it is a forum determination that decides whether the juvenile system or criminal court will handle the case.
- Because waiver does not finally determine the juvenile’s liberty or impose criminal punishment, due process does not require the same burden of proof used in delinquency adjudications (*In re Winship*) or in involuntary civil commitment (*Addington v. Texas*).
- Under § 3-817, the juvenile court may waive its exclusive jurisdiction if, after considering the statutory criteria (including the juvenile’s age, physical and mental condition, amenability to treatment, the nature of the offense, and public safety), the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the juvenile is an unfit subject for juvenile rehabilitative measures.
- The risk of error at the waiver stage is reduced because the State must still prove guilt at a later criminal trial under the protections of adult criminal procedure, including proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Procedural due process is satisfied where the waiver decision is made at a hearing with an opportunity to contest the State’s request and where the waiver order is subject to prompt appellate review.

## Conclusion

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for waiver under § 3-817(c) satisfies due process because the waiver hearing determines only whether juvenile jurisdiction should continue, not whether the juvenile is guilty, and any ultimate loss of liberty depends on later criminal proceedings with full trial protections.


In re Randolph T., 437 A.2d 230 (1981)