## Facts

- A registered voter filed a petition to recall a Port of Seattle commissioner under Washington’s recall statutes (ch. 29A.56 RCW), alleging misfeasance, malfeasance, and violation of the oath of office.
- The initial petition was rejected for an oath defect; a corrected petition was refiled with six charges and later supplemented by a memorandum and supporting materials.
- A key charge alleged the commissioner signed an October 10, 2006 memorandum concerning the Port CEO’s departure that had the potential effect of obligating the Port to pay up to a year of additional compensation (at least $239,000) beyond the CEO’s employment contract and without required commission authorization.
- Other charges alleged the commissioner improperly voted or negotiated in executive session regarding the CEO’s departure, purportedly violating the Open Public Meetings Act and constitutional limits related to public funds.
- The petitioner lacked personal knowledge of the alleged executive-session actions and relied largely on generalized media accounts lacking specific details.
- The superior court found multiple charges sufficient (including one charge as modified), rejected at least one charge, struck factual assertions in the supplemental memorandum/materials, and revised the ballot synopsis.
- The commissioner appealed, challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the recall charges.

## Issues

1. What level of factual detail and source reliability must a recall petition allege to satisfy Washington’s factual sufficiency requirement and avoid conclusory or speculative charges.
2. Whether, assuming the allegations are true, the asserted conduct constitutes misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of the oath of office under ch. 29A.56 RCW, including (a) signing a memorandum that allegedly committed public funds without authorization and (b) alleged executive-session voting/negotiation contrary to the Open Public Meetings Act.

## Decision

- The Washington Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the superior court’s sufficiency rulings.
- The Court held the charge based on the October 10, 2006 memorandum was factually and legally sufficient to proceed to the voters because it identified a specific act, date, document, and potential financial obligation that, if true, could constitute an unauthorized commitment of public funds.
- The Court held that executive-session/Open Public Meetings Act charges resting on vague, non-specific allegations drawn from media reports and lacking concrete details were insufficient and could not proceed.

## Legal Principles

- Recall petitions are evaluated under a two-part test: factual sufficiency (adequate factual basis stated concisely) and legal sufficiency (alleged acts, if true, constitute misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of the oath of office).
- The sufficiency inquiry is not a merits determination; the reviewing court assumes the allegations are true and asks whether they would legally justify recall.
- Conclusory assertions and speculative accusations are factually insufficient; charges must specify the acts complained of with enough detail to permit meaningful legal evaluation and to inform the official and the electorate.
- Recall provisions are strictly construed to screen out frivolous or purely political efforts while preserving recall where statutorily recognized misconduct is adequately alleged.

## Conclusion

The court permitted a recall charge to proceed where the petition alleged a specific, potentially unauthorized commitment of substantial public funds through a signed memorandum, but rejected executive-session allegations that lacked detailed, reliable factual support and therefore failed Washington’s recall sufficiency requirements.


In re Recall of Davis, 164 Wash. 2d 361, 193 P.3d 98 (Wash. 2008)