## Facts

- A juvenile delinquency petition alleged that Robert M., age 9 years and 10 months, committed acts that would constitute bank robbery if committed by an adult.
- At the fact-finding hearing, the defense presented evidence that Robert’s immaturity meant he lacked, or did not form, the culpable mental state required for robbery.
- Defense counsel asked the court to apply the common-law rebuttable presumption that children ages 7 to 14 are incapable of forming criminal intent unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The respondent relied on prior authority applying the common-law presumption in a juvenile matter.
- The dispute centered on mens rea and capacity rather than on whether the physical acts occurred.

## Issues

1. Whether the common-law rebuttable presumption of infancy for children ages 7 to 14 applies in New York juvenile delinquency fact-finding proceedings.
2. If the presumption does not apply, whether the petitioner proved beyond a reasonable doubt that this respondent nonetheless acted with the culpable mental state required for robbery.

## Decision

- The court held that the common-law presumption of infancy is inapplicable in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
- The court treated mental state as an element issue to be proven under the delinquency framework, not as a separate, threshold presumption of incapacity.
- On the evidence, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Robert committed the charged acts with the requisite state of mind and sustained the delinquency finding.

## Legal Principles

- The common-law infancy doctrines historically addressed both (a) the mental element of an offense and (b) legal responsibility to be held accountable; the statutory juvenile system addresses legal responsibility through age-based jurisdiction and non-criminal adjudication.
- In delinquency cases, the fact-finder focuses on “mens rea” in the offense-definition sense (the culpable mental state required by the Penal Law) and requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The Legislature’s creation of juvenile delinquency jurisdiction for children ages 7 through 15 displaces the need to import the common-law 7–14 incapacity presumption into delinquency fact-finding.
- A child’s youth may be relevant evidence bearing on whether the required mental state was actually formed, but it does not create a categorical bar to delinquency findings for school-aged children within statutory jurisdiction.

## Conclusion

The Family Court declined to apply the common-law presumption that children ages seven to fourteen are presumptively incapable of criminal intent in delinquency proceedings and instead required proof of the offense’s elements; it concluded the petitioner proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the nine-year-old respondent formed the intent necessary for robbery and adjudicated him delinquent.


In re Robert M., 110 Misc. 2d 113, 441 N.Y.S.2d 860 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1981)