## Facts

- On March 27, 1999, John Robertson violently attacked his girlfriend, Wykenna Watson.
- The D.C. Superior Court’s domestic-violence unit issued a civil protection order (CPO) barring Robertson from assaulting, threatening, or contacting Watson.
- The Superior Court’s criminal division also charged Robertson with aggravated assault based on the March 27 incident.
- On June 26, 1999, Robertson again violently assaulted Watson, conduct that also violated the CPO.
- Robertson and the United States Attorney’s Office entered a plea agreement in which Robertson pleaded guilty for the March 27 incident and the government agreed not to pursue criminal charges for the June 26 incident.
- In January 2000, Watson initiated a criminal-contempt proceeding alleging Robertson violated the CPO.
- After a bench trial, the Superior Court found Robertson guilty of three counts of criminal contempt.
- Robertson later moved to vacate the contempt convictions, arguing the plea agreement barred the contempt case and that trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking dismissal on that basis; the trial court denied the motion.
- Robertson pursued consolidated appeals challenging the contempt convictions (including a self-defense argument on one count and denial of a jury trial) and the denial of his motion to vacate (including the plea-agreement and ineffective-assistance claims). On rehearing, the D.C. Court of Appeals addressed whether a private person may initiate and prosecute this type of contempt case.

## Issues

1. Whether, in an intrafamily CPO context, a private complainant may initiate (and, with the court’s authorization, prosecute) a criminal-contempt proceeding for violation of a CPO.
2. Whether Robertson’s plea agreement—by which the government agreed not to bring criminal charges for the June 26 incident—barred a criminal-contempt prosecution based on CPO violations arising from that incident.
3. Whether Robertson was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not move to dismiss the contempt case as barred by the plea agreement.
4. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in rejecting Robertson’s self-defense claim as to one contempt count.
5. Whether Robertson was entitled to a jury trial on the criminal-contempt charges.

## Decision

- The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed Robertson’s three criminal-contempt convictions and affirmed the denial of his motion to vacate.
- The court held that, in intrafamily cases involving CPO violations, a private complainant may initiate a criminal-contempt proceeding and the court may allow the matter to be prosecuted by private counsel under the court’s control.
- The court held Robertson’s plea agreement did not bar the criminal-contempt case because the agreement addressed the government’s decision to bring criminal charges, not the court’s authority to enforce its CPO through contempt.
- Because the plea-agreement argument lacked merit, counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on that ground.
- The court rejected Robertson’s self-defense challenge and found no basis to disturb the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations.
- The court held Robertson had no constitutional right to a jury trial because the contempt offenses were petty.

## Legal Principles

- Criminal contempt for violating a CPO is a mechanism to enforce compliance with a court order and to vindicate the court’s authority, even when the same conduct could also support ordinary criminal charges.
- In D.C. intrafamily CPO matters, a private complainant may initiate criminal-contempt proceedings, and the court may permit prosecution by private counsel, subject to the court’s supervision and due-process limits.
- Plea agreements are construed using contract-like principles grounded in due process and the defendant’s reasonable understanding of the agreement’s terms.
- A plea agreement limiting the government’s ability to bring “criminal charges” does not, without clear language, bar a court-authorized criminal-contempt prosecution for violating a CPO.
- Counsel is not constitutionally ineffective for declining to file a motion that would fail on the merits.
- The Sixth Amendment jury-trial right attaches only to “serious” offenses; petty criminal contempt may be tried to the court without a jury.

## Conclusion

In re Robertson affirmed criminal-contempt convictions for violating an intrafamily civil protection order, holding that a private complainant may initiate (and, with court authorization, prosecute) a CPO-based criminal-contempt case, and that a plea agreement barring further criminal charges for the underlying conduct did not immunize the defendant from contempt sanctions for violating the court’s order.


In re Robertson, 19 A.3d 751 (2011)