## Facts

- The United States investigated suspected kickbacks (41 U.S.C. § 8702) and conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371) involving communications tied to a specific Apple email account, [redacted]@mac.com.
- The government applied under the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2703) for a warrant requiring Apple to disclose account content and related data held on premises it controlled.
- The application included a probable-cause affidavit and attachments identifying the account (place to be searched) and limiting the categories of data to be seized as evidence/instrumentalities of specified offenses within a defined time period.
- The government proposed a two-step execution method: (1) Apple would produce all account content within the date range; (2) the government would then review and retain only materials falling within the warrant’s described categories.
- A magistrate judge denied the (second) warrant application, reasoning that requiring production of all account content functioned as an unconstitutional general warrant and lacked probable cause for everything produced.
- The magistrate judge suggested that Apple should conduct the filtering and produce only responsive material.
- The government sought district-judge review, arguing the warrant was sufficiently particular and that Rule 41(e)(2)(B) permits copying/seizing large electronic repositories for later review consistent with the warrant.

## Issues

1. Whether a § 2703 warrant directing a provider to disclose all content from a specified email account (within a date range), followed by government filtering for items described in the warrant, violates the Fourth Amendment as an unconstitutional general warrant.
2. Whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(B) permits the proposed two-step collection and later off-site review for electronically stored information.
3. Whether the Stored Communications Act or the Fourth Amendment requires provider-side searching and filtering rather than government review.

## Decision

- The district court vacated the magistrate judge’s denial and granted the government’s warrant application.
- The court held the application satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement because it identified the account to be searched and limited what could be seized as evidence of specified offenses over a defined period.
- The court held the two-step procedure was permissible under Rule 41(e)(2)(B), which contemplates copying or seizing electronic repositories and later reviewing them consistent with the warrant.
- The court rejected a requirement that Apple, rather than investigators, conduct relevance filtering, concluding such a constraint was not mandated by the SCA or the Fourth Amendment.

## Legal Principles

- A warrant for electronic communications is not a general warrant merely because it authorizes initial acquisition of a large set of account data; the constitutional inquiry focuses on whether the warrant sufficiently limits what may be retained and used as evidence.
- The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement can be met for digital repositories by specifying the account or repository and bounding the categories of information to be seized by offense, time frame, and evidentiary linkage.
- Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(B) authorizes a two-step process for electronic evidence: initial copying/seizure of a repository and subsequent review limited by the warrant’s terms.
- The Stored Communications Act permits compelled disclosure of stored communications content pursuant to a probable-cause warrant and does not require provider-performed pre-screening as a condition of constitutionality.

## Conclusion

The court approved a § 2703 email-account warrant that required Apple to produce account content for a defined period and allowed investigators to conduct a later, warrant-bounded review, holding that this two-step method is consistent with Rule 41 and the Fourth Amendment when the warrant is sufficiently particular as to what may ultimately be seized and used.


In re Search of Info. Associated with [Redacted]@mac.com That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 157 (D.D.C. 2014)