## Facts

- David B. Sexson practiced law in Indianapolis from a remodeled home office shared with attorney Rollin E. Thompson and other lawyers.
- The lawyers shared a secretary, used common stationery/letterhead, and used shared telephone lines.
- Offices were routinely left open and unlocked; files were visible from a common hallway and conversations in individual offices could be heard from the hallway.
- In November 1987, Thompson was retained by Mr. and Mrs. Zimmerman to pursue a joint personal-injury claim and continued representing both spouses in that matter.
- While the personal-injury matter was still pending, Mr. Zimmerman filed for dissolution of marriage in February 1991 with separate counsel.
- Mrs. Zimmerman retained Sexson for the dissolution; Sexson appeared and filed a cross-petition on March 29, 1991.
- Thompson settled the Zimmermans’ personal-injury case on July 15, 1991.
- On July 18, 1991, Sexson sought and obtained an ex parte restraining order intended to prevent Mr. Zimmerman from negotiating the settlement check.
- On July 19, 1991, when Mr. Zimmerman arrived at the shared office to pick up the settlement check from Thompson, Sexson met him and served the restraining order.

## Issues

1. Whether Sexson’s actions for Mrs. Zimmerman in the dissolution proceeding were directly adverse to a current client for purposes of Rule 1.7(a), absent informed consent.
2. Whether Sexson and Thompson were “associated in a firm” under Rule 1.10(a) such that Thompson’s concurrent representation of both spouses in the personal-injury matter was imputed to Sexson.
3. What disciplinary sanction was appropriate.

## Decision

- The Indiana Supreme Court accepted the hearing officer’s unchallenged findings, while retaining authority to make an independent determination.
- The Court found Sexson violated Rule 1.7(a) by engaging in representation directly adverse to another current client of the firm without the required belief and informed consent.
- The Court found Rule 1.10(a) applied because the shared office operations and public presentation rendered Sexson and Thompson associated in a firm for conflict-imputation purposes.
- The Court imposed a public reprimand.

## Legal Principles

- A lawyer may not represent a client in a matter directly adverse to another current client unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship and each client gives informed consent after consultation (Rule 1.7(a)).
- For conflict imputation, “associated in a firm” under Rule 1.10(a) can include lawyers who are formally separate but function as an integrated practice through shared staff, communications systems, and common outward indicia of a single firm.
- Office practices that allow cross-exposure of confidential information (e.g., visible files, audible conversations, shared administrative systems) support treating a shared-office arrangement as a firm for purposes of imputing conflicts.
- When imputation applies, one lawyer’s concurrent-client conflicts are treated as conflicts of all lawyers in the firm, barring representation absent the required consents.

## Conclusion

The Indiana Supreme Court held that a shared-office arrangement with common staffing, communications, and firm-like presentation can trigger imputed concurrent-client conflicts; representing one spouse to restrain the other spouse’s access to settlement proceeds obtained in a jointly represented matter violated the conflict rules and warranted public reprimand.


In re Sexson, 613 N.E.2d 841 (Ind. 1993)