## Facts

- S.M., age 14, brought a handgun (holstered under a jacket) when leaving home with friends.
- In a high school parking lot, S.M. encountered four older teenage boys who had been drinking.
- A verbal confrontation escalated; evidence showed S.M. retreated multiple times, apologized, displayed the gun, fired a warning shot, and called for help.
- The four boys continued advancing, threw objects, and surrounded S.M.
- S.M. fired several shots in quick succession, killing two boys and seriously injuring two others.
- In juvenile court, S.M. pleaded guilty to unlawful use of a weapon and, after a bench trial, was adjudged delinquent for two counts of voluntary manslaughter and two counts of aggravated battery; he was committed to the Illinois Department of Corrections.

## Issues

1. Whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that S.M. did not act in self-defense when he used deadly force.
2. Whether the dispositional commitment to the Department of Corrections was against the weight of the evidence or an abuse of discretion.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the delinquency adjudications for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated battery and remanded.
- The court held the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that S.M.’s belief in the need for deadly force was unreasonable.
- Because the adjudications were reversed, the challenge to the dispositional order was effectively mooted.

## Legal Principles

- Deadly force is justified if the actor reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.
- When the fact finder finds a subjective belief in the necessity of deadly force but deems it unreasonable, the proper outcome is voluntary manslaughter (imperfect self-defense); if the belief is reasonable, the actor must be acquitted on self-defense.
- The prosecution bears the burden to negate self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt once the issue is raised.
- Evidence that a juvenile was outnumbered, attempted to withdraw, and faced continued advance despite warnings may prevent a finding—beyond a reasonable doubt—that the juvenile’s fear of grave harm was unreasonable.

## Conclusion

The court reversed and remanded because the record—showing S.M. was a physically disadvantaged 14-year-old facing four advancing aggressors despite retreat and warning measures—did not allow the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his belief in imminent death or great bodily harm was unreasonable, requiring self-defense rather than voluntary manslaughter findings.


In re S.M., 416 N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)