## Facts

- A daughter died intestate.
- Her father, Albert Tarlo, shot and killed his sleeping wife and daughter, then shot himself and died a few hours later.
- The maternal grandfather, Louis Koch, claimed the daughter’s estate as next of kin on the ground that the father should be disqualified due to the killing.
- The administrator of the father’s estate claimed the daughter’s property passed to the father under the statute of distribution and therefore descended to the father’s estate.
- A Pennsylvania statute (Intestate Act of 1917 § 23) provided that no person “finally adjudged guilty” of first- or second-degree murder of the decedent may inherit from the person killed.

## Issues

1. Whether § 23 of the Intestate Act of 1917 bars inheritance when the heir killed the decedent but died before any criminal trial, conviction, and sentencing.
2. Whether the phrase “finally adjudged guilty” permits a probate court to disqualify an heir based on proof of the killing in the estate proceeding, absent a final criminal judgment.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the orphans’ court decree awarding the daughter’s estate to the administrator of the father’s estate.
- The court held that § 23 disqualifies an heir only if the heir has been convicted and sentenced for murder in a criminal court and the judgment is final (no appeal, or affirmance on appeal).
- Because the father died before any criminal adjudication, he was never “finally adjudged guilty” within the meaning of § 23, so the statutory bar did not apply.

## Legal Principles

- Under § 23 of the Intestate Act of 1917, an heir is excluded from inheriting from the person killed only upon a final criminal conviction and sentence for first- or second-degree murder.
- “Finally adjudged guilty” means adjudication in a criminal court with authority to determine guilt in murder, followed by sentence and finality of judgment.
- In construing a statute, courts may consider the statute’s history and the report of a codification commission, especially when the legislature adopts the commission’s exact draft language.
- Policy arguments against allowing a killer (or the killer’s estate) to benefit cannot override the statute’s express requirement of a final criminal adjudication.

## Conclusion

Because the statutory disqualification required a final criminal conviction and sentence, and the father died before any such adjudication, his estate was not barred from inheriting the intestate daughter’s property, and the decree awarding distribution through the father was affirmed.


In re Tarlo’s Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 172 A. 139 (Pa. 1934)