## Facts

- Thomas J., a juvenile, was arrested on January 18, 1996 in connection with an attempted robbery and released the same day to his mother’s custody.
- The State filed a delinquency petition on May 2, 1996.
- Summonses issued in May 1996 were not successfully served because Thomas J. and his mother had moved and did not receive them.
- A writ of attachment issued on June 24, 1996; it remained outstanding for years, was reviewed periodically, and was not returned until April 22, 1999.
- The adjudicatory hearing occurred on May 20, 1999—three years and four months after arrest.
- Before the hearing proceeded, Thomas J. moved to dismiss the petition for denial of a speedy trial; the juvenile court denied the motion and adjudicated him delinquent.
- The intermediate appellate court reversed on constitutional speedy-trial grounds, and the State sought further review.

## Issues

1. Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right to a speedy trial applies to Maryland juvenile delinquency proceedings.
2. If the right applies, whether the three-year-and-four-month delay between arrest and adjudicatory hearing violated the right under the *Barker v. Wingo* balancing test.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the intermediate appellate court.
- The court held that the constitutional right to a speedy trial applies in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
- Applying *Barker v. Wingo*, the court held the three-year-and-four-month delay violated Thomas J.’s speedy-trial right.
- The proper remedy was dismissal of the delinquency petition.

## Legal Principles

- The Sixth Amendment speedy-trial guarantee, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, extends to juvenile delinquency proceedings.
- Statutory time limits for juvenile matters do not displace or limit constitutional speedy-trial protections; statutory compliance does not bar a constitutional claim.
- Speedy-trial claims in juvenile delinquency cases are analyzed under the *Barker v. Wingo* factors: (1) length of delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice.
- A multi-year delay is presumptively prejudicial and triggers full *Barker* review.
- Delay attributable to the State’s lack of diligence in moving the case forward weighs against the State.
- In assessing prejudice in juvenile cases, courts consider the risk to the defense and the effects of prolonged unresolved charges on juvenile rehabilitation and timely intervention.

## Conclusion

The court recognized a juvenile respondent’s constitutional speedy-trial right and, after weighing the *Barker* factors, required dismissal where the State allowed a three-year-plus gap between arrest and adjudication with insufficient diligence and resulting prejudice in the juvenile context.


In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50, 811 A.2d 310 (2002)