## Facts

- The State of Oregon filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute first-degree sexual abuse and attempted first-degree sexual abuse.
- After the petition was filed, T.Q.N. completed a psychosexual evaluation.
- T.Q.N. moved for “conditional postponement” under a county program available to some juveniles charged with sex offenses.
- Under the program, adjudication would be postponed while the youth completed sex-offender treatment and other conditions; if the youth successfully completed the program and complied with all terms, the delinquency petition would be dismissed with prejudice.
- Oregon law (ORS 419C.261(2)(a)) authorizes a juvenile court to set aside or dismiss a delinquency petition “in furtherance of justice” after considering the youth’s circumstances and the State’s interests in adjudication.
- The State opposed T.Q.N.’s motion and argued that the county program was unlawful because the juvenile court lacked authority to order a dismissal that would occur only after future compliance with conditions.
- The juvenile court agreed with the State’s legal objection, concluding there was “no legal basis” for the conditional-postponement program, and denied the request on that categorical ground.
- The State did not argue, and the juvenile court did not decide, whether T.Q.N. was an appropriate candidate for conditional postponement assuming the court had authority to grant it.
- T.Q.N. appealed. On appeal, the State again argued that Oregon law did not give courts the specific power to dismiss a delinquency petition upon satisfaction of conditions.

## Issues

1. Does ORS 419C.261(2)(a) authorize a juvenile court to postpone adjudication and order that a delinquency petition be dismissed with prejudice upon the youth’s successful completion of specified conditions?
2. Did the juvenile court err by concluding, as a matter of law, that it lacked authority to consider conditional postponement and a contingent dismissal under ORS 419C.261(2)(a)?

## Decision

- The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.
- The court held that ORS 419C.261(2)(a) gives juvenile courts authority to dismiss a delinquency petition “in furtherance of justice” and that this authority permits a dismissal ordered to occur after the youth satisfies conditions set by the court.
- The juvenile court erred by treating the conditional-postponement program as legally unavailable and by denying T.Q.N.’s motion without exercising the discretion ORS 419C.261(2)(a) requires.
- On remand, the juvenile court must evaluate whether conditional postponement and conditional dismissal are warranted after considering the youth’s circumstances and the State’s interests in adjudication.

## Legal Principles

- ORS 419C.261(2)(a) authorizes a juvenile court to “set aside or dismiss” a delinquency petition “in furtherance of justice,” after considering (1) the circumstances of the youth and (2) the interests of the State in adjudication of the petition.
- Nothing in ORS 419C.261(2)(a) limits dismissals to immediate, unconditional dismissals; a court may structure a dismissal to take effect upon completion of treatment or other court-ordered conditions, so long as the statutory standard is applied.
- A juvenile court commits legal error when it concludes it lacks authority to consider a conditional-postponement arrangement under ORS 419C.261(2)(a), rather than deciding whether dismissal in furtherance of justice is appropriate for the individual youth.
- When a trial court’s ruling rests on an incorrect view of its statutory authority, the proper remedy is reversal and remand so the court can decide the request using the correct legal standard.

## Conclusion

In *In re T.Q.N.*, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that ORS 419C.261(2)(a) permits a juvenile court to postpone adjudication and order dismissal with prejudice to occur after the youth completes specified conditions, and it reversed because the juvenile court wrongly concluded it had no legal basis to consider that form of relief.


In re T.Q.N., 365 P.3d 1112 (2015)