## Facts

- An eight-year-old minor attending a Hartford public school found a small pistol in the schoolyard.
- He hid the pistol in a hallway and later brought it back to school, showing it to other children.
- After a dispute with a classmate about whether the pistol was real, he fired it to prove it was real and shot the classmate.
- The state filed juvenile delinquency petitions arising from the incident.
- The juvenile court adjudicated him delinquent for second-degree assault, dismissed other counts, and committed him to the Department of Children and Youth Services for up to four years.
- The respondent moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing the common-law infancy presumption (ages seven to fourteen) barred delinquency adjudication absent proof of capacity; the trial court denied the motion.

## Issues

1. Whether the common-law infancy defense, including the presumption of incapacity for children between seven and fourteen, applies in Connecticut juvenile delinquency proceedings.
2. If the defense applies, whether the state’s failure to rebut the presumption required a judgment of acquittal (or non-adjudication of delinquency).

## Decision

- The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the delinquency adjudication and the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal.
- The court held that the common-law defense of infancy does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings.
- The court reasoned that delinquency proceedings are statutory and civil in character, oriented toward guidance and rehabilitation rather than criminal punishment.
- The court concluded that importing a criminal-law incapacity defense would conflict with the statutory juvenile scheme by preventing court-supervised rehabilitation.

## Legal Principles

- Juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal prosecutions; they are statutory proceedings primarily aimed at the care, guidance, and rehabilitation of minors while protecting societal interests.
- The common-law infancy doctrine developed to shield young children from criminal punishment and therefore is inapplicable in delinquency proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
- Absent legislative incorporation, common-law defenses tied to criminal responsibility do not automatically carry into a comprehensive statutory juvenile delinquency framework.
- The state need not prove a child’s criminal capacity under the common-law infancy presumption as a prerequisite to adjudicating delinquency in juvenile court.

## Conclusion

Connecticut’s highest court held that the common-law infancy defense has no application in juvenile delinquency proceedings; delinquency may be adjudicated under the statutory rehabilitative system without requiring the state to rebut the common-law presumption of incapacity for children aged seven to fourteen.


In re Tyvonne M., 211 Conn. 151, 558 A.2d 661 (Conn. 1989)