## Facts

- Valerie Lenise Walker, age 14, was accused of persistent misconduct, including habitual disobedience, staying out at night, and problems at school.
- Valerie’s mother filed a juvenile petition alleging Valerie was an “undisciplined child” under North Carolina’s juvenile code then in effect.
- At the August 17, 1971 undisciplined-child hearing, the court did not appoint counsel because that adjudication did not authorize commitment to an institution restricting liberty; the court adjudicated Valerie undisciplined and placed her on probation.
- Valerie later continued violating expectations, and her probation officer sought a delinquency adjudication.
- At the delinquency hearing, the court appointed counsel because delinquency could lead to institutional confinement; Valerie was adjudicated delinquent and committed to a training/reform school.
- Valerie appealed, arguing the failure to appoint counsel at the earlier undisciplined-child hearing violated due process because that adjudication contributed to the later delinquency disposition.

## Issues

1. Whether due process requires appointed counsel at an undisciplined-child hearing when that proceeding, under the law in effect, cannot result in institutional commitment curtailing the juvenile’s liberty.
2. Whether the absence of counsel at the undisciplined-child stage invalidates a later delinquency adjudication and commitment entered after counsel was appointed.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the delinquency adjudication and commitment.
- The court held there was no constitutional right to appointed counsel at the undisciplined-child hearing because that proceeding could not result in institutional commitment or comparable restraint on liberty.
- The court concluded that due process requirements concerning counsel were satisfied at the later delinquency proceeding, where counsel was appointed and commitment was possible.

## Legal Principles

- The constitutional right to counsel in juvenile court proceedings is required, at minimum, in proceedings to determine delinquency when the proceeding may result in commitment to an institution that curtails the juvenile’s freedom.
- A juvenile status proceeding that cannot itself lead to institutional confinement does not, on that basis alone, trigger a constitutional requirement of appointed counsel.
- The right-to-counsel analysis turns on the authorized consequences of the particular proceeding under the statute in effect at the time of the hearing, not on potential downstream effects in later proceedings.

## Conclusion

Because the undisciplined-child adjudication could not, by itself, lead to institutional confinement, due process did not require appointment of counsel at that initial hearing; the later delinquency commitment was constitutionally valid because counsel was provided when confinement became a possible outcome.


In re Walker, 191 S.E.2d 702 (N.C. 1972)