## Facts

- Between 1995 and 2007, D.D. (mother) and W.H. (father) had their parental rights to four other children involuntarily terminated, based on concerns including the mother’s mental illness and chemical dependency and the father’s abusive conduct.
- The mother became pregnant with S.M.H. around December 2007.
- In March 2008, the father was involved in criminal conduct and was incarcerated when S.M.H. was born on August 29, 2008.
- On September 2, 2008—days after the birth—the county filed a petition to terminate both parents’ rights to S.M.H., relying on the statutory ground tied to the parents’ prior involuntary terminations.
- While the termination matter was pending, the parents visited S.M.H. weekly.
- The parents attempted to obtain parenting classes and counseling from an agency, but the agency declined because it had previously worked with them, there was no reunification plan, and S.M.H. was not in their custody.
- At trial, a social worker testified that no available services would make the parents safe caregivers for S.M.H.
- The district court found the parents’ interest in improving their parenting to be superficial and found that nothing material had changed since the 2007 termination proceeding.
- The district court terminated both parents’ rights based on palpable unfitness, but it did so without making an express finding that termination was in S.M.H.’s best interests.
- The parents appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the parents’ prior involuntary terminations triggered the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), and, if so, whether the parents presented sufficient evidence to rebut it.
2. Whether the district court erred by terminating parental rights without making an express best-interests determination as required in a TPR case.
3. Whether the district court’s findings and analysis were sufficient given the parents’ evidence of post-birth visitation and efforts to obtain services.

## Decision

- The court of appeals reversed and remanded.
- The prior involuntary terminations triggered the rebuttable presumption of palpable unfitness, but the presumption did not end the inquiry or shift the ultimate burden of proof away from the county.
- The district court did not adequately account for the evidence the parents offered regarding their current efforts (including regular visitation and attempts to obtain parenting education and counseling) when applying the presumption.
- The district court committed reversible error by terminating parental rights without an express finding that termination was in the child’s best interests.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings and findings consistent with the required statutory analysis.

## Legal Principles

- Under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), a prior involuntary termination of parental rights to another child creates a rebuttable presumption (prima facie evidence) that the parent is palpably unfit to parent.
- The presumption shifts the burden of production to the parent to come forward with evidence of current fitness or changed circumstances; the petitioning agency retains the burden of persuasion to prove a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence.
- A district court must consider a parent’s rebuttal evidence; the presumption cannot be treated as conclusive.
- Termination of parental rights requires more than a statutory ground: the court must also determine that termination is in the child’s best interests and must make findings that show the best-interests factors were analyzed.
- In a TPR appeal, appellate courts review whether the district court’s findings address the statutory requirements and whether the termination order rests on legally sufficient findings.

## Conclusion

The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the termination order and remanded because, although prior involuntary terminations triggered a rebuttable presumption of palpable unfitness, the district court was still required to evaluate the parents’ rebuttal evidence and make an express determination that termination was in S.M.H.’s best interests, which it did not do.


In re Welfare of the Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538 (2009)