## Facts

- Kristen Lynn Fox and Reginald Brilliant were unmarried and had one child, Kaylee Brilliant.
- Kristen, Reginald, and Kaylee lived together in Massachusetts for less than a year before Reginald moved to Texas.
- After Kristen graduated from high school, she and Kaylee moved to Texas to live with Reginald in El Paso.
- After arriving in Texas, Kristen took steps consistent with relocating: she signed onto Reginald’s apartment lease, applied for jobs, transferred Kaylee’s medical/immunization records to a Texas clinic, and notified the Social Security Administration to send Kaylee’s Social Security materials to a Texas address.
- During the Texas stay, Kaylee formed relationships with Reginald’s Texas family.
- Not long after the move, Kristen told Reginald she planned to return to Massachusetts with Kaylee.
- Reginald filed a Texas suit affecting the parent-child relationship and obtained a temporary restraining order preventing Kristen from removing Kaylee from El Paso County.
- Kristen nevertheless left Texas with Kaylee for Massachusetts in violation of the restraining order; Kristen and Kaylee had been in Texas for a total of about 45 days.
- In the Texas case, Kristen did not file an answer addressing the merits of custody; instead, she appeared only to challenge Texas subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, arguing Massachusetts was Kaylee’s home state and the Texas stay was temporary.
- The trial court denied Kristen’s jurisdictional challenge and later granted Reginald a default judgment, appointing him sole managing conservator, appointing Kristen possessory conservator, and setting visitation.

## Issues

1. Whether the Texas trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to make an initial child-custody determination when Kaylee had lived in Texas about 45 days and previously lived in Massachusetts.
2. Whether the trial court erred by entering a default custody judgment against Kristen, including whether she received adequate notice of the setting.

## Decision

- The court of appeals affirmed the judgment.
- Texas had UCCJEA jurisdiction because no state qualified as Kaylee’s “home state” at the time the suit was filed, and Texas satisfied the UCCJEA’s significant-connection and substantial-evidence basis for initial custody jurisdiction.
- The default judgment was upheld because Kristen had notice and an opportunity to participate; after the jurisdictional challenge was denied, her failure to answer on the merits permitted the court to proceed by default.

## Legal Principles

- Under the UCCJEA, a state has “home state” jurisdiction only if it is the child’s home state when the case is filed, or if it was the home state within the prior six months and a parent (or person acting as a parent) still lives there.
- If there is no home state, a court may exercise initial custody jurisdiction when (1) the child and at least one parent have significant connections with the state beyond mere physical presence and (2) substantial evidence concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and relationships is available in the state.
- Whether a relocation is temporary may be evaluated using objective actions showing an intent to live in the state (such as leasing arrangements, employment efforts, and transferring medical or government records).
- A parent’s removal of a child in violation of a court order does not defeat jurisdiction when the statutory jurisdictional grounds are met.
- When a party appears only to contest jurisdiction and does not file a merits answer after jurisdiction is confirmed, a trial court may proceed to a default judgment if notice requirements are satisfied.

## Conclusion

The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the default custody judgment naming Reginald Brilliant sole managing conservator, holding that Massachusetts was not the child’s UCCJEA home state because neither parent continued to live there, Texas had significant connections and evidence tied to the child’s care and relationships, and Kristen Fox’s notice and participation choices did not require reversal of the default judgment.


In the Interest of Brilliant, 86 S.W.3d 680 (2002)